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FOREWORD
Henry Sokolski has written an excellent, short
book about what he sees as our not so peaceful nuclear future. While short in length, it covers a lot of
ground, and because it is extensively footnoted, it can
lead readers to the broader literature.
The book provides a good picture of the growing
stockpiles of separated plutonium and the stockpiles
of highly enriched uranium, as well as the likely expansion of nuclear power programs in additional
countries. When reading the book, my thoughts turned
to the Per Bak book, How Nature Works, and the concept of self-organized criticality and its descriptions
of computer simulations and experiments leading to
avalanches in sandpiles. This may be a useful way of
thinking about the possible consequences for nuclear
weapon proliferation as the stockpiles of ﬁssile material grow. Also, as we think about the likelihood
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should
be aware that developing nuclear weapons may be
easier as time passes and computing power increases, high energy explosives improve, and diagnostic
technology advances.
Sokolski includes a discussion of the question,
does it matter if more countries have nuclear weapons? He points out that a number of respected people
say it does not; some say it would be a more stable
world. Sokolski disagrees; I am with him, for two
reasons. First, those who say it will not matter, I believe, tend to assume that deterrence of attacks by
others is almost automatic. There is little discussion
of the vulnerability of the weapons, delivery systems,
command and control systems, and more. Having a
well-protected second-strike capability historically

xvii

was not automatic; it took time and effort, changed
operational practices, etc. Second, the Russians have
been writing for at least 15 years of the need they have
for tactical nuclear weapons to defend their large territory, because they say they do not have the resources
to defend conventionally. They call for a new generation of nuclear weapons that would be easier to use.
They more recently developed an interest in the early
use of tactical nuclear weapons to quickly de-escalate
a conﬂict.
If such use occurred, especially if it led to the successful de-escalation of a conﬂict on their borders, it
might be a trigger for an avalanche of proliferation, a
la Per Bak’s sandpiles, a much larger avalanche than,
in the case of Iran, getting nuclear weapons, which has
been the subject of several studies in recent years. The
successful Russian use would be the ﬁrst operational
use of nuclear weapons in many decades and would
revive consideration of the value of tactical nuclear
weapons. In any case, it is not clear that this would be
a very peaceful world.
The problems arising from the growing stockpiles are addressed in the book and some ideas are
put forward—a good start on how to limit the dangers
that may ﬂow from that growth. The author raises important questions that deserve continued attention.
		

Andrew W. Marshall
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UNDERESTIMATED:
OUR NOT SO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FUTURE
INTRODUCTION
It was curious and sad that after his death, Albert
Wohlstetter, a former professor of mine and a major force in American strategic planning for nearly a
half-century, was criticized for not having written a
book. His apologia, albeit unspoken, was that he had
more important things to do with guiding U.S. and
international policy, which he did effectively in so
many ways, including framing the debate over what
should be done about nuclear proliferation. His work,
and that of his wife and chief collaborator, Roberta
Wohlstetter, are best understood through the many
policy and economic studies they wrote and the profound impact they had on U.S. and allied security and
energy policies.1
Although I served 11 years in the Pentagon and as
a staffer on Capitol Hill, I have no such excuse. The
clearest proof of this is this slim volume, the sequel
to my ﬁrst book, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign
against Strategic Weapons Proliferation.2 That volume
was largely historical and written in support of a graduate-level course I teach on nuclear energy policy. The
thinking behind Best of Intentions was straightforward:
Determining where we are necessarily requires familiarity ﬁrst with where we have been. I wrote that volume because, at the time, there was no critical history
of nonproliferation available to dispatch my students
in any practical direction.
As I continued to teach, though, I noticed another
gap in the literature. The arguments policymakers
and academics were making on how nuclear weap-
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ons reductions related to preventing further nuclear
proliferation were, at best, uneven. Each of the basic
views—ofﬁcial, hawkish, and academic—spotlighted some important aspect of the truth, but each was
incomplete and surprisingly optimistic.
The current ofﬁcial U.S. view, shared by most arms
control proponents, is that any state that has nuclear
weapons is obliged to make further nuclear weapons
reductions under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). The superpowers promised to make such reductions, they contend, to get nonweapons states to
accept intrusive nuclear inspections and to abstain
from acquiring nuclear arms. Most who hold this
view also believe that nuclear weapons are only useful to deter others’ use of these weapons, that this mission can be accomplished with relatively few nuclear
weapons, and that, as such, we can make significant
additional strategic arms reductions at little or no cost
to our national security. Pursuing such reductions and
strengthening existing nuclear security measures also
are desirable, they argue, because nuclear weapons
and their related production infrastructures are vulnerable to unauthorized or accidental ﬁrings, terrorist
seizure, sabotage, and possible use.
Most of those holding these views also argue that
states with advanced “peaceful” nuclear technology
are obliged to share it with nonweapons states as a
quid pro quo to get these states to uphold their NPT
nonproliferation pledges. Thus, civilian nuclear sharing, nonproliferation, and strategic arms reductions
are viewed as three equally critical “pillars” of an NPT
“bargain.”3
A second, more hawkish view rejects these positions, arguing that the link between nuclear reductions and proliferation is negative: Further signiﬁcant
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nuclear weapons cuts could well encourage America’s
adversaries to “sprint to nuclear parity.”4 Such efforts,
in turn, could easily spook Washington’s allies who
lack nuclear weapons (e.g., Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
South Korea, and Japan) to hedge their security bets
by going nuclear themselves. To avoid such proliferation, this group contends that keeping or increasing
U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities (especially vis-à-vis
China and Russia) is our best bet.
Finally, some academics are skeptical of both of
these views. They identify themselves as “neorealists.” The most radical and thought-provoking of
these are divided roughly into two camps—those that
believe nuclear deterrence works and those that do
not. This difference is signiﬁcant but not as great
as what uniﬁes their thinking—a shared disbelief that there is an important link between nuclear
weapons reductions, nonproliferation, and international security.
Those in the more established of these two camps
emphasize what they believe to be the automaticity
of nuclear deterrence. They contend that the further
spread of nuclear weapons is far less harmful to the
world’s security than is commonly assumed and that,
because nuclear weapons are so effective in deterring
wars, their further proliferation could actually help
keep the peace.
A recent offshoot from this established neorealist
school rejects this faith in nuclear deterrence. It sees
little military value in nuclear weapons but (for this
reason) also concludes that their further spread is
largely inconsequential. As for trying to prevent proliferation, this newer camp argues this can be far more
dangerous and provocative—they spotlight the invasion of Iraq—than letting these weapons spread.5
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Each of these views—ofﬁcial, hawkish, and radically academic—is intellectually attractive. Each is concise. All, however, are incomplete. None fully explore
the regional insecurities that arise with threatened nuclear weapons breakouts or ramp-ups. Instead, they
dwell on the security impacts of nuclear proliferation
after states actually have broken out or ramped up.
Nor do they have much to say about the signiﬁcant
overlaps between civilian and military nuclear activities or the risk that “peaceful” nuclear facilities or
materials might be diverted to make bombs. Instead,
they focus almost exclusively on nuclear weapons and
their impact on international security (albeit in differing time frames).6 Finally, none adequately consider
the discontiguous view that fewer nuclear weapons in
fewer hands is desirable but that rushing to achieve
such reductions without ﬁrst getting key nuclear
states to reduce in a transparent, coordinated fashion
could easily make matters worse.
This brief volume covers each of these points.
First, it reviews the key popular views on nuclear
proliferation. Second, it considers how much worse
matters might get if states continue with relatively
loose nuclear constraints on civilian and military
nuclear activities. Finally, it offers several policy
recommendations.
WHAT WE THINK
For the last half-century, the task of limiting nuclear arsenals has been viewed as being related to, but
different from, preventing proliferation. Nuclear arms
restraints are “fostered” through nuclear weapons negotiations, agreements, and norms as well as by states
deploying “stable” strategic weapons forces—i.e.,
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ones that can readily survive even if they are struck
ﬁrst and that are themselves incapable of totally destroying a key opponent’s nuclear forces in a ﬁrst
strike. In contrast, one “ﬁghts” or “combats” the further spread of nuclear weapons by imposing export
controls, economic sanctions, international inspections, preventative and preemptive military strikes;
and by conducting covert intelligence and military
operations.7 The most signiﬁcant nuclear arms control
efforts historically have been undertaken by the most
heavily nuclear-armed states—principally the United
States and Russia. Preventing nuclear proliferation, in
contrast, is generally a global undertaking.
The Barack Obama administration is noteworthy
among recent presidencies for consciously having
tried to integrate U.S. nuclear arms control efforts
with its nonproliferation policies. Following Obama’s
2009 appeal in Prague, the Czech Republic,8 to eliminate nuclear weapons, the U.S. Government made
reducing nuclear arms a prerequisite for preventing
their further spread. If we expect other nations to repress their own nuclear weapons aspirations, administration ofﬁcials argue that the nuclear superpowers
have to demonstrate a greater willingness to disarm
themselves. Such disarmament is feasible, they insist,
because nuclear weapons are, in their view, only useful to deter other hostile nuclear weapons states. This
basic mission, they argue, can be accomplished with a
relatively small stockpile of nuclear weapons. On the
other hand, maintaining large stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons-usable fuels only increases the prospects for instability, nuclear terrorism,
and accidental or illicit use.
Hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons have
a very different view.9 They argue that reducing
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American and Russian nuclear arms has little or no
impact on reducing others’ nuclear weapons activities or holdings (e.g., North Korea and Iran). In fact,
reducing America’s nuclear arsenal might only entice
China to build up to America’s current nuclear numbers and encourage America’s key non-nuclear allies
and friends—e.g., South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey—to hedge their bets against decreasingly
credible U.S. nuclear security alliance guarantees by
developing nuclear weapons options of their own. Finally, they argue, nuclear weapons, especially in U.S.
and allied hands, have helped keep the peace, whereas
letting U.S. and allied nuclear arsenals decline quantitatively or qualitatively only increases the prospects
for war.10
The most radical of academic nuclear skeptics,
who identify themselves as neorealists, also question
whether nuclear weapons reductions are needed to
reduce further proliferation. Although they concede
that further nuclear weapons proliferation may be inevitable, they argue that it is unlikely to be destabilizing and that a credible nuclear deterrent force needs
only to be able to hold several major cities at risk, and
therefore, it need only be a relatively small, “ﬁnite”
force. The earliest proponents of such “ﬁnite deterrence” (Pierre Gallois and his French colleagues,11
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and other original supporters of the U.S. Polaris nuclear missile submarine
ﬂeet12) and, much later, Kenneth Waltz and his academic associates,13 all emphasized what they saw as
the virtual automaticity of nuclear deterrence between
any two rival nuclear-armed states. As such, French
proponents of ﬁnite deterrence insisted that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to smaller states
was more likely to prevent military aggression than to
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prompt it. Central to their thinking was the disturbing
notion that credibly threatening to destroy an adversary’s major cities (what Charles de Gaulle referred to
as “tearing off an arm”14) would deter hostile actions
by other states, both large and small.
A second, more recent version of such thinking
has been made popular by such scholars as Dr. John
Mueller, who takes a different tack but reaches similar
conclusions. He argues that nuclear weapons actually
do a poor job of deterring small or major wars.15 Citing the popular scholarship of such writers as Ward
Wilson,16 supporters of this view contend that nuclear
weapons were unnecessary to secure Japan’s surrender in 194517 or to deter World War III since North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw
Pact nations were haunted by fears of suffering a yet
deadlier conventionally armed version of World War
II.18 Also, smaller wars—e.g., the Israeli War of 1973,
the Korean and Vietnam wars—Mueller notes, clearly were not deterred by anyone’s nuclear weapons.
Nor were the terrorist attacks in the United States of
September 11, 2001 (9/11) or the terrorist attacks on
Mumbai in 2008. The implication is that nuclear weapons are so ineffective at deterring aggression and their
use is so unlikely that their further spread is not all
that consequential.19
Each of these schools also differ on the military
utility of nuclear weapons and differ on the impact
and desirability of sharing dual-use nuclear technology for civilian applications. Administration ofﬁcials
insist that nuclear supplier states have an NPT obligation to transfer as much “peaceful” nuclear technology to nonweapons states as possible so long as it is
for a declared civilian project that is internationally
inspected. Failure to do so “without discrimination,”
in their eyes, risks unraveling the NPT.20
7

Most hawks, on the other hand, object to civilian
nuclear cooperation with hostile states (e.g., Iran and
North Korea) but otherwise support the global expansion of civilian nuclear power. They certainly are willing to share such technology with close friends even
if such transfers might enhance existing or potential
weapons options (e.g., India, South Korea, or Japan).
As for the neorealists, some have faulted nuclear
nonproliferation policies for unnecessarily inhibiting
nuclear power’s beneﬁcial development domestically
and overseas, but most have no set view.21 Several
have argued that letting nuclear weapons spread to
selected countries would bolster U.S. security.22
For administration ofﬁcials and arms control advocates, then, the superpowers must reduce their arsenals (“vertically”) to encourage nonweapons states
not to proliferate (“horizontally”). Failure at this risks
instability or, worse, nuclear use. Hawkish critics,
meanwhile, believe that reducing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities is more likely to risk nuclear proliferation and war than otherwise would be the case
if one augmented U.S. and allied strategic weapons
capabilities or, at least, kept them from declining. Finally, radical academic skeptics deny that vertical reductions and horizontal nonproliferation are all that
closely linked and suggest that more nuclear weapons in more hands may actually reduce the prospects
for war or, at the very least, that nuclear weapons
and their proliferation are not all that signiﬁcant (see
Figure 1).
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Selected
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Most Western
governments (e.g.,
the United States,
France,
the United Kingdom
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Ofﬁcial/Arms
Control
Perspective
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Believe
Nuclear
Weapons
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Support
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Civil
Nuclear
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Sharing
Nuclear
Weaponsrelated
Technology

Yes

No

Yes
(for friends)

Yes
(to some
friends)

International
forums (e.g., IAEA,
NPT Review
Conference)
Nuclear weapons
enthusiasts

Hawkish
Supporters of
Nuclear
Weapons
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(e.g., Donald
Rumsfeld, Dick
Cheney)

Radical Academic
Skeptics/Finite
Deterrence
Enthusiasts

Radical Academic
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Deterrence Critics

French proponents
of force de frappe
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of U.S. SLBM force
(e.g., Pierre Gallois,
Arleigh Burke)

Yes

Yes

No

No
(for
enemies)

No
(for enemies)

Yes

Yes

No

Unclear

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Neorealists (e.g.,
Ken Waltz)

Post-neorealists
(e.g., John Mueller)

Figure 1. Nuclear Proliferation: What We Think.
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Reservations.
These three views on how nuclear weapons reductions and nonproliferation relate are clear, plausible,
and popular. They dominate the current debate over
nuclear weapons policies. There is only one problem:
In practice, none of them make nearly as much sense
as their supporters claim.
One can see this most readily by examining how
each school addresses the simplest and most popular
of policy questions: Should one be for or against nuclear weapons? Add to this question (for the purposes
of this inquiry) the matter of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the query admits to two easy answers—
yes (in support of nuclear weapons and additional
proliferation) or no against both.
Let us take the against-side ﬁrst. Those opposed to
nuclear weapons and their further proliferation—i.e.,
those who want to move toward zero nuclear weapons as soon as possible—go to great lengths explaining
why a world without nuclear weapons is preferable
to our current world. They emphasize Ronald Reagan’s observation that a nuclear war can never be won
and so should never be waged. They also detail how
a world with zero nuclear weapons might work and
how one might prevent a relapse into a nuclear-armed
world once nuclear weapons have been eliminated.23
Unfortunately, these same analysts are far less articulate on how one might persuade existing nuclear
weapons states to give their weapons up or how exactly one would get to zero. So far, the United States
and Russia have reduced their nuclear holdings
from over 70,000 deployed nuclear weapons24 to several thousand on each side.25 This begs the question,
though: How easy would it be to reduce further to
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a few hundred warheads if other states (e.g., China,
Israel, France, the United Kingdom [UK], North Korea, Pakistan, and India) acquire or deploy as many
or more? Would this not encourage increased military
competitions, nuclear arms racing, miscalculation,
and unnecessary and potentially disastrous wars?
Of course, securing clear answers to such questions
is difﬁcult. Nonetheless, analysts backing zero nuclear
weapons offer a general picture of how things might
work. According to their narrative, the more the U.S.
Government increases its support for nuclear weapons reductions and reduces its own arsenals with Russia, the more other nuclear-armed states (e.g., China,
India, and Pakistan) are likely to fall into line. To help
promote this more restrained nuclear future, it is argued, the United States and Russia should also abandon plans to ever use or defend their nuclear strategic
forces in an effort to achieve military advantage over
one another or other nations. Rather than aim their
nuclear weapons against countless military targets,
the superpowers should adopt ﬁnite nuclear deterrence strategies that hold each other’s population and
industrial centers at risk. This would reduce the need
for ever larger, more accurate, quick-alert nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in existing nuclear stockpiles
more feasible. With increasing nuclear restraint by the
major nuclear states, states lacking nuclear weapons
would become more willing to eschew nuclear weapons and support nuclear nonproliferation.26
This is the upbeat narrative, but there also is a
downbeat one. It has us clinging to our bombs. The
more we maintain our nuclear stockpiles, we are
warned, the more it will undermine our claim that
we want to rely less on nuclear arms to assure our security. This, in turn, risks encouraging other states to
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acquire nuclear weapons (i.e., promoting more North
Koreas, Irans, and Pakistans), which will only strain
existing security relations and tempt America’s allies
(e.g., South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.)
to acquire nuclear weapons options of their own.
Those backing nuclear reductions also offer historical analysis to challenge the presumed security utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms, they note, have
failed to deter important conventional wars (e.g., the
Korean or Vietnam wars or the Egyptian strike against
Israel in 1973) or terrorist attacks (e.g., 9/11 and the
Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks against targets in
India and Afghanistan).
Attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as
mere possession, also have prompted military strikes
(e.g., Iran, Israel, and the United States against Osirak
in 1980, 1981, 1991, and 2002; Iraq against Bushehr in
repeated attacks from 1984-1988; Iraq’s failed Scud
missile strike against Dimona in 1991; and Israel’s
strike against Syria’s reactor in 2007). In addition, attacks were seriously considered against new nuclear
states (e.g., the United States against the Soviet Union
in 1949 and the Soviet Union against China in 1969).27
Bottom line: The possession and spread of nuclear
weapons generally undermines security. What, then,
are nuclear weapons good for? Only the peculiar
task of deterring other states from using their nuclear
weapons.
This last reﬂection, of course, is intended to further demonstrate how little value nuclear weapons
have and why their early elimination is desired. This
conclusion, though, is triple-edged. Certainly, if nuclear weapons truly are not all that militarily valuable,
what is the urgency to eliminate them? Some states
held on to their horse cavalry after World War I and
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their battleships long after World War II, but that
hardly encouraged their rivals to acquire them, and,
by mid-century, these military instruments hardly
posed a strategic threat to anyone. On the other hand,
if nuclear weapons can effectively deter other nucleararmed states, would that not make their acquisition by
nonweapons states all but irresistible? The refrain of
security analysts after the ﬁrst Gulf War against Iraq
was that the United States would never have tried to
remove Saddam Hussein if he actually had the bomb.
In what way were they wrong?
Finally, is it reasonable to think that no one will
ever use their nuclear weapons ﬁrst? Do states that
believe in nuclear deterrence presume that, if they
lacked a survivable nuclear deterrent, their nuclear
adversaries might strike their or their allies’ vulnerable forces in an attempt to gain some clear advantage?
If so, would they constantly (and naturally) worry
that their or their allies’ nuclear retaliatory capability
might be knocked out or be seriously degraded in a
ﬁrst strike by their opponents? Would failing to attend
to these matters and merely making bluffs to retaliate
against a few targets of dubious military value (e.g.,
large population centers versus strategic weapons
bases) be worth the risk of having a force that was unlikely to deter a first strike?28
If you allowed, as one should, that the answers to
these questions might be unclear, you would expect
lengthy, heated public debate about what the answers
might be. What is telling, however, is how little debate
there is. Instead, if these issues are raised at all, the
subject of conversation invariably is shifted to a much
less contentious set of concerns: the horrors of nuclear theft, nuclear accidents, unauthorized use, sabotage, and terrorism. Focusing on these issues quickly
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returns one to the desired conclusion that the immediate reduction of nuclear weapons would immediately make for a much safer world.29 In the interim, we
need to do all we can to increase security over existing
nuclear weapons assets and reduce the readiness and
numbers of deployed nuclear forces to head off these
possible threats.
Most of these nuclear security concerns raised here,
again, are necessarily speculative. Neither accidental nor unauthorized nuclear use have yet occurred.
There is plenty of near history (close calls of Russian,
South African, French, Chinese, and American nuclear launches, tests, and thefts; broken arrow incidents;
provocative nuclear tests; and “lost” warheads and
nuclear weapons-usable materials gone unaccounted
for).30 As for preventing acts of nuclear terrorism,
though, such efforts are entirely anticipatory: Speciﬁc,
validated intelligence regarding acts of nuclear terrorism has, so far, gone wanting.31
Despite this (or, perhaps, because of it), addressing
these threats has become a public policy cause célèbre.
Today, nuclear terrorism is viewed by both Republican and Democratic ofﬁcials as the “most immediate
and extreme” threat facing America and the world.32
Billions of dollars are appropriated annually on questionable nuclear weapons detection and forensics
efforts and nuclear security and cooperative threat
reduction programs.33 Meanwhile, broad intelligence
sweeps, including of domestic phone and Internet
communications, have been justiﬁed, in no small part,
to prevent possible terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).34
Far less controversial are the international nuclear
security summits Obama launched in 2009. The third,
held in The Netherlands in 2014, allowed scores of
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nations, including those acquiring or deploying nuclear weapons, to extol the virtues of keeping their
nuclear weapons-related assets safe against seizure,
sabotage, and illicit use. Details about how they might
accomplish this, however, were kept, as with previous
summits, to a minimum, lest hostile states learn what
might be needed to attack or seize these holdings.
Although this set of nuclear security worries has
been spotlighted to maximize alarm, many who voice
them are nonetheless convinced that further progress
on nuclear arms control, which would eliminate most
of these problems, is all but inevitable. They celebrate
the latest New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) agreement and are enthusiastic about reaching further unilateral and negotiated cuts as well as
ratiﬁcation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT).35 They also remain steadfast in their
belief that negotiated settlements can be reached to
roll back Iran’s and North Korea’s “aberrant” nuclear
misbehavior. Yet, little is said about other nuclear or
near-nuclear weapons states. Instead, there is selfcongratulation that President John F. Kennedy’s earlier warnings that there might be 20 or more nuclear
weapons states by 1970 proved to be unfounded and
insistence that pushing more arms control is our best
hope to eliminate the nuclear threat.
What else must be pursued besides more START
negotiations and nuclear security summits? Three
things, all of which Obama announced in his 2009
Prague speech: Bring the CTBT and Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) into force and share “peaceful” civilian nuclear technology under appropriate
international safeguards. This roughly tracks the now
popular “three-pillar” view of the NPT, that to get
nonweapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons,
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the weapons states must reduce their nuclear arms
and offer more “peaceful” nuclear energy transfers.
Putting aside the improbability of the U.S. Senate or Moscow backing the ratiﬁcation of more arms
control agreements any time soon, accomplishing this
agenda is impossible without the unlikely support of
reluctant states, including Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, and Egypt. More important, some
of the objections to these agreements are not merely
political, but substantive.36
As for sharing “peaceful” nuclear technology and
disarming to secure continued nonproliferation, it
is difﬁcult to see how such an approach can prevent
future Indias, Irans, Syrias, or North Koreas. Even if
one ignores how little of the NPT’s diplomatic history
actually supports today’s legalistic enthusiasm for
the “three-pillar” view,37 promoting this bargain is, at
best, problematic.
First, although encouraging nuclear weapons restraint can indirectly support nonproliferation, it is
unclear how insisting on making nuclear disarmament a legally binding quid pro quo for adopting sound
nonproliferation measures would work. In practice,
nonweapons states have held their adoption of nonproliferation measures hostage, thereby attempting to
force the superpowers to do more toward nuclear disarmament. While at the same time, the claim by nonweapons states that insufficient progress by the superpowers gives the nonweapons states a diplomatic
pretext to threaten to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. From a nuclear control perspective, none of
this is helpful. Backing off necessary nonproliferation
controls only increases the prospects for more nuclear
weapons proliferation. This, in turn, is only likely to
increase demands for nuclear armament globally.
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Second, it is unclear how supplying nonweapons
states with the beneﬁts of truly “peaceful” nuclear
technology could assist in promoting more or tighter
nonproliferation controls. If the technology in question is genuinely benign, by deﬁnition, it ought to be
easy to safeguard effectively against military diversions and so be safe to share free of any apprehensions
it might be diverted to make bombs. If, furthermore,
the nuclear item in question is proﬁtable to sell, it is
difﬁcult to understand why nuclear supplier states
would need additional incentives, much less nonproliferation ones, to share it.
On the other hand, if what was being sold is proliferation-prone (i.e., close or essential to bomb making)
and, therefore, dangerous to share, it is unclear why
any state eager to promote nuclear nonproliferation
would think it had an NPT obligation to transfer it.
Again, effective nuclear nonproliferation presumes
the sharing of only truly “peaceful” nuclear goods and
technologies—i.e., of nuclear items and know-how
that are so far from making bombs that attempts to
divert them for this purpose easily could be detected
early enough and reliably enough to intervene effectively to prevent any weapons from ever being built.
The alternative would be that there is an NPT obligation to share dangerous nuclear technologies and
goods that could bring a nonweapons state to the very
brink of acquiring bombs. But how much nonproliferation sense would encouraging such commerce or
mechanically holding adoption of sound nonproliferation measures hostage to further nuclear disarmament ever make? The answer is painfully clear.
This, then, brings us to those hawks who object to
such wishful thinking—those who are “for” nuclear
weapons. Their brief essentially is that nuclear weap-
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ons have kept the peace. If you push for deeper nuclear
reductions, they argue, it will do nothing to slow determined proliferators from acquiring nuclear weapons.38 More important, it could undermine our security alliance system, which, in turn, would increase the
risks that our friends and allies might go nuclear.39 All
of this, in turn, would only increase the prospects for
war and the possible use of nuclear weapons.
This line of argument, like that of the zero nuclear
weapons crowd, makes a number of sensible points.
Yet, it is imperfect, too. First, as has already been noted, we know that nuclear weapons have not deterred
all wars. Both North Korea and North Vietnam took
the United States on in long-fought wars. Nor did U.S.
nuclear weapons deter China and Russia from lending
Hanoi and Pyongyang substantial military support.
Then there is the Israeli war of 1973. Israeli possession
of nuclear arms may have changed the way the war
was fought (the United States ﬁnally came to Israel’s
aid at the last moment for fear that the war might go
nuclear). But Israeli nuclear weapons did not prevent
the war.40 Finally, it is unclear how, if at all, nuclear
weapons might deter nonstate actors from engaging
in terrorism—nuclear or non-nuclear.41
Perhaps the point is nuclear weapons have prevented “major” (nuclear) wars or “major” defeats
rather than all forms of military aggression. Certainly, the number of war casualties as a percentage
of the world’s population has declined signiﬁcantly
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.42 This seems more
persuasive.
The ﬁrst problem, here, though, is that any “proof”
of why something did not happen can never be known
with scientiﬁc certainty. As we have discussed, a good
number of security experts question if nuclear deter-
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rence ever really “worked” during the Cold War.43
Nor is the threat of nuclear escalation the only possible
explanation for why post-World War II war casualties
have declined so much (smaller wars usually follow
large ones; new post-war alliances were created and
kept strong; and, military science improved, lowering aiming inaccuracies and indiscriminate damage in
war, etc.).
This, then, brings us to the second problem—this
argument’s lack of qualiﬁcation. If one allows that nuclear weapons have deterred major wars, what is one
to make of the observation? If some nuclear weapons
have deterred some wars, would more nuclear weapons that were more advanced or an ability to produce
them quickly deter even more?44 Would such deterrence encourage increasing nuclear stockpiles and
resuming nuclear testing?45 Also, what of other states
that lack such arms? Should their acquisition of nuclear forces help deter wars as well? Would the further
proliferation of weapons, at least to our friends then,
be a good thing? Vice President Dick Cheney went out
of his way to note that, if China failed to get North
Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons capabilities, it
might well prompt Japan to acquire nuclear weapons
of its own. One also hears hawkish American support
for Israel maintaining its nuclear forces until there is
peace in the Middle East and for India to build its nuclear capabilities to counter China’s nuclear forces.46
As logically consistent as these arguments may
be, they are bound to cause unease. Here, an unspoken assumption is that nuclear deterrence will work
perfectly (as it supposedly did with Russia during the
Cold War) and that it can be counted upon to work
forever into the future with every other nuclear-armed
state. This is presumed no matter how many nuclear-
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armed states there might be, how rash or reckless these
countries’ leaders are, or how ill-prepared their forces
might be to absorb a ﬁrst strike. It also presumes, sub
silentio, that the lack of truly disastrous nuclear weapons accidents, unauthorized ﬁrings, acts of nuclear
terrorism, and thefts we have experienced so far is a
permanent feature.47 All of this might well be correct
in the near- and mid-term. But barring the adoption
of new, more effective nuclear restraints and security
controls that apply not just to the United States but to
other nations, it is difﬁcult to believe it is much more
than a “bet against the house.”
Yet another unspoken assumption at play is that
smaller nuclear weapons states and states eager to
develop a nuclear weapons option are merely “lesser included threats.” The notion is that if the United
States can deter or constrain Russia, the largest nuclear weapons state, the United States and its allies are
safe (or much safer) against any other lesser nucleararmed state. This roughly was the message in the 2012
presidential election campaign when candidate Mitt
Romney described Russia as America’s number one
geopolitical foe, and the Obama administration defended the primacy of working with Russia (versus
China or other nuclear states) to limit its nuclear arsenal. Russia is our most important strategic competitor.48 Deal with it and you can deal with the others;
fail to neutralize Moscow, and you are unlikely ever
to prevail.49
But is this true? Russian President Vladimir Putin
has yet to threaten to destroy the United States explicitly or American forces stationed overseas with a nuclear strike. North Korea, however, has. If North Korea followed through with its military threats against
South Korea or Japan (two states the United States
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is bound by formal security agreements to defend),
would that not threaten a general war that the United
States would be loath to wage? What if Iran got nuclear weapons and deployed them to deter the United
States and its Gulf allies against countering Iranian
aggression and covert actions against its neighbors?
Such aggression could drive the price of oil to levels
that could strategically weaken both the United States
and most of the world’s economies. Would nuclear
strategic superiority over Russia enable Washington
to counter such concerns?
This set of rhetorical questions brings us to the
views of radical academic skeptics. As already noted,
this school can be split into two groups. The ﬁrst includes those who think that the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons may be beneﬁcial, and, that upon
a state’s acquisition of nuclear arms, effective nuclear
deterrence is automatically assured. The second includes those who question the deterrence value of nuclear arms but who also believe that preventing their
proliferation is generally unnecessary or misguided.
What is appealing about the second group is its
willingness to take on those who extol the virtues of
nuclear deterrence (i.e., the academic skeptics’ ﬁrst
camp and hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons).
Did nuclear weapons force Japan to surrender in
World War II? No, Japan’s emperor only argued they
surrendered because he knew Japan was destined for
defeat by American and Soviet conventional arms.
Did they deter the Soviet Union’s nuclear and conventional forces from invading Europe during the Cold
War? No, what kept the peace after 1945 was the creation of effective East-West security alliance systems
and the very real fears these military alliances fostered
of a massive, conventional World War III breaking out
if Cold War diplomacy failed.
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This second group of academic skeptics also offers
thoughtful rejoinders to the conventional wisdom that
nuclear terrorism should be worry number one. Is the
threat of nuclear terrorism the most imminent and extreme security threat we face? Not really. There are
good reasons why no acts of nuclear terrorism have
yet taken place and why these are likely to apply well
into the future. Building or stealing nuclear weapons
is too large and complex an operation for most terrorist organizations. A terrorist team tasked to build or
seize such weapons constantly would have to worry
about being penetrated and betrayed to authorities.
Certainly, the high levels of trust and cooperation
needed to pull off such operations would be difﬁcult
to maintain. Nor is it in the interest of states that possess such weapons to let anyone but the most trusted
and loyal gain access to them.50
This pushback to what are now the most popular
views on nuclear deterrence and terrorism is edifying. Yet, ultimately, one counterfactual on what might
have prevented an event (in this case, various postWorld War II wars) can hardly trump another. Nor do
negative projections on nuclear terrorism top positive
ones if only because the future probability of events
that have not yet occurred cannot be known statistically. In the end, all such projections are speculative.
Also, what the two skeptical camps do agree
about—that the dangers associated with nuclear
weapons proliferation are exaggerated—is rebuttable.
First, both camps gloss over the serious military risks
faced by nations acquiring nuclear weapons. One can
see this most clearly by their inattention to the numerous historical cases of preventive military actions
against states attempting to build their ﬁrst bomb and
serious plans countries have made to knockout the
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nuclear capabilities of new nuclear weapons states. In
the ﬁrst category are the British campaign against the
Nazi-operated heavy water plant in Norway, Iran’s air
strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1980, Israel’s attack of the same reactor in 1981, Iraq’s repeated strikes
against Bushehr between 1984 and 1988, America’s air
strike against Iraq’s nuclear facilities in 1991, Saddam’s
failed Scud missile strike against Israel’s Dimona reactor in the same year, an American Tomahawk strike
against Iraq’s uranium enrichment plant at Zaafaraniyah, British and American strikes against a variety
of suspect Iraqi nuclear sites in 1998, and Israel’s air
strike against Syria’s covert nuclear reactor in 2007.
Just as numerous are the occasions that states
planned or prepared to knockout the nuclear weapons capabilities of their adversaries. The U.S. military
gave serious thought to using nuclear weapons to
destroy the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex in 1949
and China’s in 1964. It also made preliminary military preparations for attacking North Korea’s nuclear
complex in 1994. The Russians, meanwhile, seriously
considered attacking South African nuclear facilities
in 1976 after detecting South African preparations to
test. They even asked the United States for assistance
in making the attack. In 1969, a major border dispute
between China and Russia went hot, and Moscow
gave serious consideration to attacking China’s nuclear complex. Two years before, Egypt planned to attack
Israel’s production reactor at Dimona. Some believe
it collaborated with Moscow in making these plans.
Israel and India, meanwhile, cooperated in several
schemes in the 1980s (one of which nearly was implemented) to knockout Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
facilities at Kahuta.51

23

Second, either because they believe nuclear weapons automatically deter aggression nearly perfectly
even in small numbers or because they believe nuclear
weapons are militarily useless even if they are numerous and advanced, radical academic skeptics pay little
attention to the security risks that may come with
deep nuclear weapons reductions—i.e., the transitions
from nuclear plenty to zero. These risks, which hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons emphasize, are
potentially serious.
Finally, radical academic skeptics tend to ignore or
gloss over the risks “upward” nuclear transitions present. These dangers are three-fold. First, as the number
of nuclear weapons players increases, the gravity,
complexity, and likelihood of ruinous nuclear incidents may increase within states (e.g., unauthorized
or accidental use, terrorist theft, irredentist seizure,
etc.) and between them (e.g., catalytic wars, misread
nuclear signaling, etc.). Second, and closely related,
are the numerous technical and managerial challenges
each nuclear state faces to make their nuclear forces
robust and survivable enough to have any hope of effectively deterring attacks. These challenges are most
severe for new nuclear weapons forces but are hardly
inconsequential for large, mature forces.52 Last, as the
number of states possessing nuclear forces increases
to include nations covered by nuclear security alliance guarantees, the continued viability and coherence of these security alliance systems is likely to be
tested in the extreme, thereby increasing the prospects
for war.53
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Optimists All.
Putting aside the close calls during the various
Cold War crises (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis54), the
nuclear brinkmanship that has been conducted by India and Pakistan,55 and the nuclear preemption and
dares of the Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973,56 none of the
cases noted earlier seem to support the idea that nuclear proliferation is “inconsequential,” much less stabilizing; just the opposite. Of course, until and unless
there is nuclear use, there is no proof in these matters:
We cannot predict the future, and the causes of wars
are always complex. All we know is that the United
States ﬁred nuclear weapons in anger on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Japan, and the United States and Russia threatened to use them several times during the
Cold War. However, for some reason, since 1945, they
never have been used.
It would be nice to believe that they never will. Unfortunately, they might. Russia and Pakistan are quite
explicit about the advantages of using nuclear weapons ﬁrst against their adversaries.57 Some analysts
also now believe China’s no ﬁrst use policies may be
undergoing revision.58 All of these states, plus Israel,
North Korea, and India, are increasing or modernizing their nuclear arsenals. If these states are followed
by Iran, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), or Saudi Arabia,59 the chances for
nuclear miscalculations and war would likely go up,
not down.60
Again, it may well be, as one recent analysis suggested, that the prospects for war will decline as soon
as there is “symmetry” between any two nuclear
states. This conclusion, however, begs the question
of precisely when and how such “symmetry” might
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be achieved or perceived by each party. This matters since this same analysis concludes that, without
such nuclear symmetry, the prospects for conﬂict are
increased.61
Nor can we assume that the consequences of nuclear use will be minor. Total industrial wars may no longer be likely. But this hardly precludes the possibility
of “limited” nuclear conﬂicts.62 Also, with advanced
societies’ newfound distaste for protracted wars has
come an increased intolerance for violence. America’s
security state reaction to 9/11 certainly suggests the
public desire for security has reached a new all-time
high. A nuclear event almost anywhere, as a result, is
likely to prompt even more security (i.e., repressive)
governance; think 1984. For governments originally
dedicated to the proposition of enlightened self-rule,
this should be a concern.63 At the very least, it ought to
inform our thinking about nuclear weapons and their
possible use.
Yet, those eager to go to zero ultimately do not appear to be all that worried that states might intentionally use these weapons. They believe just the opposite.
Most nuclear abolitionists acknowledge that nuclear
weapons are “only” useful to deter nuclear attacks
and assert that they do. For them, it would be “irrational” for states to use nuclear weapons to secure a military advantage. Nor do they seriously consider that
Russia, Pakistan, or China might be developing their
nuclear forces for purposes other than deterrence.
Their worries instead focus optimistically on the yet
unprecedented threats of nuclear terrorism and unauthorized use. Finally, they are convinced that deeper
U.S. nuclear reductions will prompt others to do likewise and insist that, despite the not so peaceful past
nuclear activities of India, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Turkey,
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North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Syria, sharing
more dual-use nuclear technology will help “strengthen” the NPT.
Nuclear hawks, meanwhile, may fear that our enemies might use nuclear weapons but are “cautiously” optimistic that the United States and its allies can
be made safe against such threats so long as the right
number of nuclear weapons of the right kind in the
right hands are on the ready, and the United States
and its friends are willing and able to knockout proliferators’ nuclear projects in a timely fashion through
conventional military strikes and covert action. Regarding the nuclear security concerns of the abolitionists, they are confident: We have avoided accidental
and illicit use so far; with due diligence, we can manage this problem into the future.
Finally, radical academic skeptics are perhaps the
most optimistic of all: Further nuclear proliferation is
either good or, at least, not a worry. Nuclear weapons
deter nuclear wars completely or are so useless they
never will be used.
Each of our current views of nuclear proliferation,
then, ends up serving our highest hopes. The question is whether they adequately address what should
be our biggest worry. Do they deal with the possible
military diversion of “peaceful” nuclear energy—a
dual-use technology sure to spread further? Do they
adequately address the perils of making nuclear cuts
as other states continue to hold or increase their arsenals? Do they assume that if we maintain our nuclear
weapons force capabilities, we will forever deter the
worst? Do they fully consider the military risks states
run when they acquire their ﬁrst nuclear weapon or
try to ramp up existing arsenals signiﬁcantly? Can any
of them alone serve as a practical guide to reducing
the nuclear challenges we face?
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WHERE WE ARE HEADED
With most of the world’s advanced economies still
stuttering in recession, Western support for increased
defense spending at new lows, and a major emerging Asian power increasingly at military odds with
its neighbors and the United States, it is tempting to
view our times as rhyming with a decade of similar
woes—the disorderly 1930s.64 Might we again be drifting toward some new form of mortal national combat? Or will our future more likely ape the near-halfcentury that deﬁned the Cold War—a period in which
tensions between competing states ebbed and ﬂowed,
but peace mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual
fear and loathing?
The short answer is, nobody knows. This much,
however, is clear: The strategic military competitions
of the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has
yet seen. Assuming U.S., Chinese, Russian, Israeli,
Indian, French, British, and Pakistani strategic forces
continue to be modernized and America and Russia
freeze or further reduce their strategic nuclear deployments, the next arms race will be run by a much larger
number of contestants with highly destructive strategic capabilities far more closely matched and capable
of being quickly enlarged than in any other previous
period in history.
Looking Backward.
To grasp the dimensions of this brave new world,
one need only compare how capable states were of
striking their adversaries suddenly a half-century
ago, with what damage they might inﬂict today. In
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1962, Washington and Moscow engaged in the most
signiﬁcant of Cold War nuclear confrontations over
the Soviet deployment of nuclear-capable missiles in
Cuba. At the time, the United States had over 24,000
operationally deployed nuclear weapons. Russia had
nearly 2,500. The other nuclear powers—the UK and
France—had an aggregate of no more than 50 (with
France possessing few, if any, deployed nuclear weapons).65 The difference in nuclear weapons deployment
numbers between the top and bottom nuclear powers—a ﬁgure equal to at least three orders of magnitude—was massive. America, moreover, was clearly
dominant.
In contrast, today the United States has no more
than 2,130 deployed strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, and Russia has 3,600.66 India, Pakistan, the UK,
France, and Israel have 100 to 400 each, and China may
have between 190 and 900.67 Putting aside North Korea’s nascent nuclear force (cf. France’s force of 1962),
the difference in the numbers of nuclear deployments
between the top and bottom nuclear powers, then, has
fallen at least two full orders of magnitude and is projected to decline even further (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. From U.S. Strategic Dominance to a
Compressed Nuclear Crowd.68
As tight as the nuclear deployments between the
world’s nuclear-armed states has become, the potential for this nuclear balance to shift quickly and dramatically is far greater than it was a half-century ago.
In 1962, the United States, Russia, the UK, and France
had militarized nearly all of the nuclear weapons
materials they had. They held little or nothing back
in reserve. Nor could any of them militarize civilian
stockpiles of separated plutonium or highly enriched
uranium (HEU), as no such stockpiles were then
available.
Today, things are quite different. First, the United
States and Russia alone can redeploy thousands of
reserve nuclear weapons and reconﬁgure stockpiled
ﬁssile materials into tens of thousands of additional
nuclear weapons. Second, ofﬁcials in Japan publicly
have admitted that they have the means to militarize
nearly 11 metric tons of “civilian” plutonium (i.e.,
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enough to make more than 2,000 first-generation
bombs)69 that they have stored domestically.70
India, meanwhile, has many hundreds of bombs’
worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium on tap, is
planning on expanding its capacity to produce more
of this material significantly over the next 3 to 10
years, and has claimed to have tested a nuclear device
using this “reactor-grade” material.71 Third, China has
produced tons of nuclear material that it might yet
militarize and is considering building a “civilian” plutonium reprocessing plant adjacent to one of its major
military nuclear production sites that could produce
over 1,500 bombs’ worth of plutonium annually.72
Also, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, South Korea, and North
Korea either make or are planning to produce such
nuclear fuels (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. National Stockpiles of Separated
Plutonium.73
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As for enriched uranium, the United States and
Russia each still easily have more than 10,000 crude
bombs’ worth of surplus weapons-grade uranium on
hand (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. National Stockpiles of Highly Enriched
Uranium.74
The amount China may have deployed in weapons
is unclear, but a conservative estimate of the HEU it
has produced is 16 metric tons—i.e., enough to make
roughly 800 ﬁrst-generation implosion weapons.75 India, meanwhile, has enough highly enriched uranium
stockpiled to make several hundred additional crude
nuclear implosion weapons, as do France and the UK
(see Figure 4).
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As for the future, both Japan and China plan
on increasing their uranium enrichment capacity
signiﬁcantly. South Korea would like to enrich uranium as well. As will be discussed, all of these efforts are likely to be in excess of anything called for
commercially.
This, then, brings us to the next qualitative strategic metric of interest, long-range missile delivery
systems. In 1962, only the United States and the Soviet Union had missiles capable of delivering a firstgeneration nuclear weapon any distance. Today, 24
states do.76 To be sure, many of these states only have
theater-range systems. But most of these states are in
hotspots like the Middle East, where missiles of such
range are more than sufﬁcient to strike several neighbors.77 Meanwhile, the rest of the world’s nuclear-capable missile states are able to target this same region
with intercontinental or medium-range systems.
As for the total number of nuclear-armed states,
this figure has increased as well. A half-century ago,
only the United States, Russia, the UK, and France had
nuclear arms, and an overwhelming number of these
weapons were in the hands of the United States (see
Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Four Nuclear Weapons States in 1962.
Now, there are nine nuclear-armed states. Two—
the UK and France—are within NATO and coordinate
their nuclear plans. North Korea, meanwhile, is a state
that the major powers hope will give up its few nuclear arms in negotiations. In this world, U.S. ofﬁcials
like to think that most of the current nuclear-armed
states are U.S. allies, partners, or strategic stakeholders (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. How the United States Views
the World Today.
This world, however, may not last. Certainly, Tehran may yet militarize its nuclear holdings; and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, South Korea, and Japan
must now all be viewed as possible near- or mid-term
nuclear weapons-ready states. Unlike France, China,
Russia, and the UK, these post-Cold War nuclear
weapons aspirants may not announce their acquisition
of their ﬁrst nuclear weapon by testing it. Instead, they
are likely to develop “peaceful” nuclear energy programs, as Iran, India, Iraq, and North Korea did, and
then move toward nuclear weapons only when they
conclude it is useful to do so. Whether or not “safety”
and nuclear stability in this new world will be “the
sturdy child of [mutual] terror” (Winston Churchill’s
description of Cold War stability)78 remains to be seen.
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Certainly, the stool of nuclear deterrence will have
many more legs that could give way in many more
surprising ways than were possible a half-century ago
(see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Possible Proliferated Future.
Why Worry?
As already noted, a fashionable rejoinder to such
broodings is to insist that all of these states will be
mutually deterred. Any intelligent state, it is argued,
should know that using nuclear weapons is militarily
self-defeating and that these weapons’ only legitimate
mission is to deter military threats. According to this
view, fretting about nuclear use and proliferation is
mistaken or overwrought.79
But is it? Can states deter military threats with nuclear weapons if their actual use is universally viewed
as being self-defeating? Which states, if any, actually
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believe they are militarily useless? As noted earlier,
the Russians and Pakistanis clearly do not. Just the opposite: They have gone out of their way to develop
battleﬁeld nuclear weapons and plan to use them ﬁrst
to defeat opposing advanced conventional forces. As
for the United States, France, and the UK, all have
studiously refused to renounce ﬁrst use. Israel, meanwhile, insists that, while it will not be ﬁrst to introduce
nuclear weapons in the Middle East, it will not be second. This leaves North Korea—a wild card—and India and China, whose declared no ﬁrst use policies are
either unclear or under reconsideration.80
But are not the days of highly destructive wars—
nuclear or non-nuclear—behind us? Certainly, with
the events surrounding 9/11, this view has gained the
support of an increasing number of U.S. and allied
military analysts and pundits.81 Reﬂecting this outlook, the United States and its European allies have
turned several Cold War nuclear “survival” bunkers
into private real estate opportunities or historical
tourist sites.82
The problem is that at least two states have not.
U.S. intelligence agencies have determined that Russia invested over $6 billion to expand a 400-squaremile underground nuclear complex at Yamantau a
full decade after the Berlin Wall fell. This complex is
burrowed deep enough to withstand a nuclear attack
and is large enough and provisioned sufﬁciently to
house 60,000 people for months (see Figure 8). U.S.
intelligence ofﬁcials believe it is one of a system of as
many as 200 Russian nuclear bunkers.83
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Figure 8. Russian Underground Nuclear Complex
at Yamantau.84
China’s nuclear passive-defense activities are no
less impressive. In 2009, China’s strategic missile
command, the 2nd Artillery Brigade, revealed that
it had completed 3,000 miles of dispersed, deep, underground tunnels for the deployment of its nuclearcapable cruise and ballistic missile forces. China spent
enormous sums to build this system and is still expanding the complex, which is known as the Underground Great Wall. The system is said to be designed
and provisioned to house thousands of military staff
during a nuclear exchange (see Figure 9).85
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Figure 9. China’s Underground Great Wall.86
North Korea also has gone to extensive lengths to
protect its strategic assets. Almost all of its nuclear and
long-range military systems have underground tunneled bases or host areas. South Korean intelligence
estimates that North Korea has in excess of 10,000
underground facilities to protect its key military and
civilian assets.87
Going Ballistic.
All of this suggests that several nuclear-armed
states still believe they may have to endure or engage
in a nuclear exchange. Fortifying this suspicion is the
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increasing capacity states have to deliver quickly both
nuclear and non-nuclear payloads against one another. Back in 1962, only the United States and Russia
had nuclear-capable missile systems—i.e., cruise or
ballistic missile systems capable of delivering a ﬁrstgeneration nuclear warhead (which would weigh 500
kilograms) 300 kilometers or farther.88 Now, no fewer
than 24 countries have perfected or acquired such systems, and nine can launch a satellite into orbit—i.e.,
have all that is needed to deploy an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). In addition, the United States,
China, Iran, South Korea, Israel, and key NATO states
are all working on precision conventional missiles capable of knocking out large military bases and major
naval surface combatants that only a few decades ago
were difﬁcult or impossible to destroy without using nuclear weapons.89 More nuclear-capable missile
states are likely to emerge (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Nuclear-Capable Missile
Countries Today.90
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The strategic uncertainties these missile trends can
generate are difﬁcult to exaggerate. First, the proliferation of long-range missiles allows many more countries to play in any given regional dispute. One way
to measure a state’s diplomatic shadow or potential
to inﬂuence others militarily is simply to map out the
range arcs of its deployed missiles. Today, increasingly, these arcs overlap. Consider Iran. The reach of its
missiles now intersects with that of missiles based in
Israel, Egypt, the UAE, Syria, Russia, Pakistan, France,
Saudi Arabia, China, the UK, and the United States.
This is a very different world than that of a halfcentury ago. In 1962, when alliance loyalties within
the Communist bloc and the free world were at their
height, only Russia and America’s missiles were
aimed at each other. Now, there is no Communist
bloc, what remains of the free world alliance system
(e.g., NATO; Australia, New Zealand, United States
Security Treaty [ANZUS], etc.) is relatively weak, and
nuclear-capable missiles in hotspots like the Persian
Gulf could be ﬁred from any number of states—both
near and far. For nuclear-armed states, this situation places a long-term premium on securing nuclear
weapons assets against surprise attack.91 It also raises
ﬁrst-order questions about nuclear escalation, which
brings us to the second reason more missiles in more
hands is a major worry: These missiles also can act as
conventional catalysts for nuclear war.
Increasingly, with precision guidance and advanced munitions technologies, it is possible to destroy targets that once required nuclear weapons—
e.g., large airstrips and airfields, command centers,
naval ports, and large, moving surface ships—with a
handful of conventionally armed missiles instead. This
has raised the prospect of states being able to knock-
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out a signiﬁcant portion of an opponent’s key military
forces without having to use nuclear weapons.92
The good news is that this should make the initial
use of nuclear weapons far less likely. The bad news
is that with enough precision guidance capabilities, a
state might be tempted to initiate combat in the expectation of winning without ever having to go nuclear
and end up miscalculating badly.
War Scenarios.
A real-world case, now taken seriously by Pakistani security analysts, is the mid-term prospect of an
Indian conventional missile decapitation of Pakistani
strategic command nodes. The Indians, in this scenario, would use precise, offensive, long-range missiles against Pakistan’s nuclear forces and command
centers. Then, New Delhi could fend off any Pakistani
retaliatory nuclear strike with India’s much larger nuclear forces and with Indian non-nuclear missile defenses. Finally, India could prevail against Pakistani
armor and artillery, with superior Indian military conventional forces.
To hedge against this prospect, Pakistan has already ramped up its nuclear weapons production and
is now toying with deploying its nuclear weapons in
ways designed to complicate Indian opportunities to
knock them out (e.g., delegation of launch authority
under certain circumstances, forward deployment,
dispersal, mobility, etc.). All of these methods only increase the prospects for nuclear use and have goaded
India to develop nuclear ramp-up options of its own.
Beyond this, advanced conventional weapons
might ignite a nuclear conﬂict directly. Again, consider India and Pakistan. After being hit by so many
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Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks, the Indian government has developed a conventional counterstrategy
known as “Cold Start.” Under this approach, India
would respond to Pakistan-backed terrorist attacks
by quickly seizing a limited amount of Pakistani territory, with Indian forces deployed to march on command immediately (i.e., from a cold start). The idea
here would be to threaten to take enough away from
Pakistan that it holds dear, but not enough to prompt
Pakistan to threaten India with its nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, India’s Cold Start plan has had nearly
the reverse effect. Shortly after New Delhi broached
this strategy, Pakistani military ofﬁcials announced
their intent to use tactical nuclear weapons against any
invading Indian force and deployed new, short-range
nuclear-capable tactical missiles along the PakistaniIndian border precisely for this purpose. India replied
by deploying tactical missiles of its own. It is unclear
just how serious either India or Pakistan are about carrying out these war plans, but this uncertainty is itself
a worry.93
Of course, relying on nuclear weapons to counter
conventional threats is not unique. Moscow, faced
with advanced Chinese and NATO conventional
forces, has chosen to increase its reliance on tactical
nuclear weapons. For Russia, employing these weapons is far less stressful economically than trying to
ﬁeld advanced conventional forces and is militarily
pragmatic, given Russia’s shrinking cohort of eligible
military servicemen. China, in response, may be toying with deploying additional tactical nuclear systems
of its own.94
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China and the Nuclear Rivalries Ahead.
All of these trends are challenging. They also suggest what the next strategic arms race might look like.
First, if the United States and Russia maintain or reduce their current level of nuclear weapons deployments, it is possible that at least one other nuclear
weapons state may be tempted to close the gap. Of
course, in the short- and even mid-term, Pakistan, Israel, and India could not hope to catch up. For these
states, getting ahead of the two superpowers would
take great effort and at least one to three decades of
continuous, ﬂat-out military nuclear production. It is
quite clear, moreover, that none of these states have
yet set out to meet or beat the United States or Russia
as a national goal.
China, however, is a different matter. It clearly
sees the United States as a key military competitor
in the Western Paciﬁc and in Northeast Asia. China
also has had border disputes with India and historically has been at odds militarily with Russia as well.
It is not surprising, then, that China has actively been
modernizing its nuclear-capable missiles to target key
U.S. and Indian military air and sea bases with advanced conventional missiles and is developing even
more advanced missiles to threaten U.S. carrier task
forces on the open seas. In support of such operations,
China is also modernizing its military space assets,
which include military communications, command,
surveillance, and imagery satellites and an emerging
anti-satellite capability.95
Then there is China’s nuclear arsenal. For nearly 30
years, most respected Western security analysts have
estimated the number of deployed Chinese nuclear
warheads to be between 190 and 300.96 Yet, by any
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account, China has produced enough weapons-usable
plutonium and uranium to make four or more times
this number of weapons. Why, then, have Chinese
nuclear deployments been judged to be so low?
First, China has experienced firsthand what might
happen if its nuclear weapons fell into the wrong
hands. During the Cultural Revolution, one of its
nuclear weapons laboratories test ﬁred a nucleararmed medium-range missile over heavily populated
regions of China and exploded the device. Not long
after, Mao ordered a major consolidation of China’s
nuclear warheads and had them placed under much
tighter centralized control. Arguably, the fewer nuclear warheads China has, the easier it is for its ofﬁcials
to maintain control over them.97
Second, and possibly related, is China’s declared
nuclear weapons strategy. In its ofﬁcial military
white papers since 2006 and in other forums, Chinese
ofﬁcials insist that Beijing would never be ﬁrst to use
nuclear weapons and would never use them against
any non-nuclear weapons state. China also supports
a doctrine that calls for a nuclear retaliatory response
that is no more than what is “minimally” required for
its defense. Most Western Chinese security experts
have interpreted these statements to mean Beijing is
interested in holding only a handful of opponents’
cities at risk. This, in turn, has encouraged Western
ofﬁcials to settle uncertainties regarding Chinese nuclear warhead numbers toward the low end.98
What China’s actual nuclear use policies might
be, though, is open to debate. As one analyst recently
quipped, with America’s ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons
against Japan in 1945, it is literally impossible for any
country other than the United States to be ﬁrst in using these weapons. More important, Chinese ofﬁcials
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have emphasized that Taiwan is not an independent
state and that, under certain circumstances, it may be
necessary for China to use nuclear weapons against
this island “province.” Also, there are the not-soveiled nuclear threats that senior Chinese generals
have made against the United States if it should use
conventional weapons against China in response to a
Chinese attack against Taiwan (including the observation that the United States would not be willing to risk
Los Angeles to save Taipei).99
Finally, as China deploys more land-mobile and
submarine-based nuclear missile systems, there will
be increased technical and bureaucratic pressures to
delegate more launch authority to each of China’s
military services. China’s ballistic missile submarines already have complete nuclear systems under
the command of their respective submarine captains.
As China deploys ever more advanced road-mobile
nuclear missiles, its commanders are likely to want to
have similar authority. Historically, such delegation
of launch authority has come with increased nuclear
weapons requirements.100
The second cause for conservatism in assessing
China’s arsenal is the extent to which estimates of the
number of Chinese warheads have been tied to the
observed number of Chinese nuclear weapons missile
launchers. So far, the number of these systems that
have been seen is relatively low. Moreover, few, if any,
missile reloads are assumed for each of these missile
launchers, and it is presumed that only a handful of
China’s missiles have multiple warheads. The numbers of battleﬁeld nuclear weapons, such as nuclear
artillery, are also presumed to be low or nonexistent.
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All of this may be right, but there are reasons to
wonder. The Chinese, after all, claim that they have
built 3,000 miles of tunnels to hide China’s nuclearcapable missile forces and related warheads and that
China continues to build such tunnels. Employing
missile reloads for mobile missile systems has been
standard practice for Russia and the United States.
It would be odd if it was not also a Chinese practice,
particularly given China’s growing number of landmobile solid-fueled rocket and cruise missile systems.
With China’s recent development of the DF-41, a massive, mobile, nuclear-armed ICBM, and its deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry
vehicles (MIRVs) on its silo-based DF-5s, U.S. authorities believe China may deploy a new generation of
mobile MIRV missiles.101 Also, as already noted, several experts believe China may be ﬁelding battleﬁeld
artillery for the delivery of tactical nuclear shells.
Precisely how large is China’s nuclear arsenal,
then? The answer is unclear. The Chinese say they are
increasing the size of their nuclear weapons arsenal
“appropriately.”102 They have not yet said by how
much. In 2012, General Viktor Yesin, the former chief
of Russia’s strategic rocket forces, told U.S. security
experts that China may have more than 900 deployed
nuclear weapons and another 900 nuclear weapons
stored in reserve.103 This estimate, which is roughly
seven times greater than most analysts believe Beijing
possesses, would give China roughly as many warheads as the United States currently has deployed.104
Putting aside how accurate this Russian estimate
might be, the ﬁrst problem it and other larger estimates
present is how sound long-term U.S. and Russian strategic plans might be. It hardly is in Washington’s or
Moscow’s interest to let Beijing believe it could threat-
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Number of Nuclear Warheads

en Taiwanese, Japanese, American, Indian, or Russian
targets conventionally because its nuclear forces were
so large Beijing could assume they would deter any
of these states from ever responding militarily (see
Figure 11).
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Figure 11. The Next Decade: Nuclear Weapons
Uncertainties.105
Yet another question that a much larger Chinese
nuclear strategic force would raise is how it might impact future U.S.-Russian strategic arms negotiations.
As China has increased its deployments of highly
precise, nuclear-capable missile systems, Moscow
has chaffed at the missile limits that the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) imposes
on it ﬁelding similar systems. Since the conclusion
of New START in 2011, Moscow has balked at making any further cuts unless China is included in the
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negotiations. Shortly after several U.S. security analysts and members of Congress spotlighted Russian
moves to break out of the INF Treaty,106 the State
Department announced that Russia had, in fact, violated the treaty.107 American hawks, meanwhile, have
warned against the United States making further nuclear cuts lest other states, like China, quickly ramp
up their force levels to meet or exceed ours. All of this
suggests the imperative for Washington and Moscow
to factor China into their arms control and strategic
modernization calculations. The question is how.
Other Interested Parties.
Unfortunately, getting a sound answer to this
question may not be possible without ﬁrst considering
the security concerns of states other than the United
States, Russia, and China. Japan, for one, is an interested party. It already has over 1,700 weapons’ worth
of separated plutonium on its soil. This plutonium
was supposed to fuel Japan’s light water and fast reactors, a ﬂeet which, before the accident at Fukushima,
consisted of 54 reactors. After the accident, Japan shut
down all of these plants, decided to reduce its reliance
on nuclear power as much as possible, and is projected in the mid-term to bring no more than one-third of
its light water reactor ﬂeet back online.108 Meanwhile,
Japan’s fast reactor program has been effectively frozen since the 1990s due to a series of accidents. Japan,
the United States, and France plan on cooperating on
a renewed effort, but it is unlikely that a new fast reactor will be operating in Japan for decades.109
A related and immediate operational question
is whether or not Japan will bring a $20-billion-plus
commercial nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing plant
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Metric Tons of Separated Plutonium

capable of producing roughly 1,500 bombs’ worth of
plutonium a year at Rokkasho online sometime after
the spring of 2016. This plutonium recycling effort has
been controversial. The original decision to proceed
with it was made under Prime Minister Nakasone
and can be tied to internal Japanese considerations of
developing a plutonium nuclear weapons option. Although this plant is not necessary for the management
of Japan’s spent fuel, the forward costs of operating it
could run as high as $100 billion over its lifetime. Each
year this plant operates, it is expected to produce eight
tons of weapons-usable plutonium—enough to produce nearly as many ﬁrst-generation nuclear weapons
annually as is contained in America’s entire deployed
nuclear force110 (see Figure 12).

Total if Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) operates
and MOX use delayed

Figure 12. Japanese Plutonium Stocks and Projected
Production.111
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In light of the questionable technical and economic
beneﬁts of operating Rokkasho, especially given the
reduced number of reactors likely to be online in Japan, it would be difﬁcult for Tokyo to justify proceeding with this plant’s operation unless it wanted to
develop an option to build a large nuclear weapons
arsenal.112 Given that Japan currently retains more
than nine tons of mostly reactor-grade separated plutonium on its soil—enough to make over 1,700 firstgeneration nuclear warheads—there is no immediate
need to bring Rokkasho online to assure a military
nuclear option. However, Japan says it is committed
to eliminating this surplus plutonium stockpile, and
recently it promised to surrender roughly 800 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to
the United States in pursuance of this stated goal.113
In this context, keeping Rokkasho on the ready could
be seen as a kind of national security insurance policy.
Some leading Japanese ﬁgures clearly see it in this
light114 and technically, there is little question that the
plutonium could be used to make effective weapons.115
In this regard, even under a much less nationalistic,
pro-nuclear government than the one just elected, in
the fall of 2012, Japan’s National Diet felt compelled to
clarify in law that the purposes of the country’s atomic
energy program include supporting Japan’s “national
security.”116 Many nuclear observers outside of Japan
saw this as a not-so-veiled reference to Japan’s “civilian” plutonium-fuel cycle program.
Certainly, South Korean and Chinese ofﬁcials and
commentators spotlighted this prospect with concern.117 Their apprehensions, then, raise the question:
What might happen if Japan ever decided to open
Rokkasho? How could this avoid stoking South Korean ambitions to make their own nuclear fuels? What
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of China’s long-term efforts to modernize its own
nuclear weapons systems and its “peaceful” scheme
of building a copy of Rokkasho itself, adjacent to one
of its earliest plutonium nuclear weapons production
sites? Would starting up Rokkasho only catalyze these
efforts? What if Japan’s startup of Rokkasho came after some Chinese or North Korean military provocation? Might this trigger an additional round of Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean military and
nuclear hedging actions?
Yet another “peaceful” East Asian nuclear activity
that bears watching is the substantial plans both Japan and China have to enrich uranium. Both countries
justify these efforts as being necessary to fuel their
light water reactor ﬂeets. There are several difﬁculties
with this argument, though. First, both countries already have access to foreign uranium enrichment services that are more than sufﬁcient to supply current
demand. Second, any effort to become commercially
self-sufﬁcient in enriching uranium in the name of
“energy independence” is questionable for Japan and
China, given their lack of economic domestic sources
of high-grade uranium ore.
Even assuming China could stop importing enrichment services, as it now does from URENCO of
Europe and Minatom/Tenex of Russia, it still would
want to import most of its uranium ore from overseas.
Of course, having commercial enrichment capacity
could afford bargaining leverage to secure cheaper
foreign enrichment service contracts. But in China’s
case (and Japan’s and South Korea’s cases as well),
such leverage can be had at enrichment capacities
far below those they have or are planning to acquire.
Again, both uranium ore and enrichment services are
readily available globally at reasonable prices and
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are projected to remain so. In fact, uranium yellowcake spot prices are currently at historic lows. As for
enrichment services, the World Nuclear Association
pegs the world’s current surplus of uranium enrichment capacity to be well above international demand
and projects supply will outstrip demand by nearly
50 percent through 2020.118 In short, there is no lack
of enrichment services internationally and, given
China’s access to Russian and European enrichers,
there is little or no immediate economic imperative for
building more.
China, however, sees things differently. It currently has enough capacity to fuel a dozen large reactors
and is building more than enough centrifuges to fuel
58 gigawatts of nuclear capacity, optimistically projected to be online by 2020.119 Some of this projected
capacity may be set aside for possible reactor exports
beyond those China is making to Pakistan. Yet, again,
given the foreign enrichment services glut, none of this
enrichment expansion makes much economic sense.
What is all too clear, however, is just how much of a
military option this enrichment capacity affords. Currently, China could use its civilian enrichment plants
to make weapons-grade uranium sufﬁcient to build
over 500 nuclear weapons annually; by 2020, China’s
planned enrichment capacity could produce material
sufﬁcient for more than 2,500.120
Japan’s enrichment plans differ only in scale. Like
China, it, too lacks domestic sources of high-grade uranium ore. As for Tokyo’s current enrichment capacity,
it can fuel about eight reactors a year. On the other
hand, it can make approximately 4,500 kilograms of
weapons-grade uranium annually—enough to make
at least 200 ﬁrst-generation nuclear weapons.121 Japan’s plans to expand its enrichment capacity for 2020
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might enable Japan to fuel one-half or all of its projected reactor ﬂeet (depending on just how many of
its reactors it brings online in the next 6 years). The
question, in light of the global surplus of commercial
uranium enrichment capacity, though, is why Japan
would bother. This same planned enrichment capacity, it should be noted, would be enough for Japan to
make more than 300 ﬁrst-generation nuclear weapons
annually (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Current and Projected East Asian
Uranium Enrichment Capacities.122
As noted, none of these Japanese nuclear fuel making activities and plans sit well with China or South
Korea. Seoul, in a not-so-well-disguised security
hedge, began to press Washington in 2009 for permission to separate “peaceful” plutonium from U.S.origin spent fuel and to enrich U.S.-origin uranium in
Korea. These requests coincided with several other
South Korean security-related demands. The ﬁrst of
these came after North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan
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and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. South
Korean parliamentarians asked the United States to
redeploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.
Washington refused.123 Then, Seoul pushed Washington to extend the range of its nuclear-capable missiles
from 300 to 800 kilometers and practically be freed
from range limits on its cruise missile and space satellite launchers. Washington agreed.124 As for South
Korea’s nuclear demands, Seoul is likely to continue
to press its case.125
The question is, what is next? Will Japan start
Rokkasho as planned after the spring of 2016? What
commercial nuclear fuel making activities, if any,
might Washington allow South Korea to engage in?
Will North Korea or China continue to engage in provocations that will increase Japanese or South Korean
demands for more strategic military independence
from its American security alliance partner?
The two popular rejoinders to these questions are
that there is no reason to worry. Most experts insist
that neither Japan nor South Korea would ever acquire nuclear weapons. The reasons why are simple.
It would not only undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime that they have sworn to uphold and
strengthen, but also it would risk their continued security ties with their most important ally, the United
States.
Perhaps, but when it ﬁrst doubted its American
security guarantees in the 1970s, South Korea tried to
get nuclear weapons.126 Those doubts continue today
as North Korea builds up its nuclear and non-nuclear
forces against the South.127 More recently, on May 29,
2014, South Korea’s president noted that if North Korea tested another nuclear weapon, it would make it
difﬁcult “to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring
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in this area”—a clear warning not only to North Korea, but also the United States and China, that if they
fail to prevent Pyongyang from further perfecting
its nuclear force, Japan and South Korea might well
acquire nuclear weapons of their own.128
Yet, another optimistic view argues that it may
actually be in Washington’s interest to let Japan and
South Korea go nuclear. Letting them arm might actually tighten America’ relations with these key allies
while reducing what the United States would otherwise have to spend for their protection. Implicit to this
argument is the hope that neither Seoul nor Tokyo
would feel compelled to acquire many weapons—
i.e., that like the UK, they would eagerly integrate
their modest nuclear forces with that of America’s
larger force and share their target lists with Washington, and Washington would do likewise with them
(as Washington already has with London).129
Again, this is plausible. But it is worth noting that
Japan and South Korea are not the UK. Early on, the
UK understood its nuclear weapons efforts ultimately
would be subordinate to and in the service of maintaining its “special relationship” with Washington
(and scaled down its nuclear efforts accordingly).
With the Japanese and South Koreans, though, their
nuclear efforts would unavoidably be seen as a vote
of no conﬁdence in Washington’s nuclear security
guarantees. As such, these efforts would have to deal
with demands by nationalists eager to build a truly
independent national nuclear force of much more
ambitious dimensions.130 More important (and more
likely), even if Japan and South Korea wanted to keep
their forces subordinate to those of the United States,
they might both still be driven to acquire very large
forces of their own given the likely military reactions
of China, North Korea, and other nuclear states.
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Consider the action-reaction dynamic Seoul or Tokyo going nuclear might set into motion with Beijing
and Pyongyang. Presumably, in all cases (China included), each state would try to protect its strategic
forces against possible attacks by building more passive defenses (hardening, mobility, tunneling, etc.).
They also would focus on building up their offensive
forces (both nuclear and non-nuclear) so they might
eliminate as much of each other’s strategic forces as
soon as any war began (this to “limit the damage”
they would otherwise suffer). Finally, they would
increase the number of nuclear weapons assets, missile portals, and other strategic aim points to prevent
any of their adversaries from thinking they could
“knockout” their retaliatory forces. This, roughly, is
what unfolded during the Cold War rivalry between
Washington and the Soviet Union. As was the case for
Russia and the United States then, it could easily drive
up East Asian nuclear weapons requirements well
beyond scores or even hundreds of weapons.131
Potentially catalyzing this rivalry further are the
actions China’s immediate nuclear neighbors might
take. As has already been noted, the Russians are unlikely to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments if
the Chinese increase theirs. As for India, it already has
roughly 100 nuclear weapons and many hundreds of
bombs’ worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium it
claims it can fashion into nuclear weapons. It is hedging its nuclear bets even further with plans to build
ﬁve unsafeguarded plutonium-producing breeder
reactors by 2020 and build an enrichment plant that
may double its production of weapons-grade uranium.132 Late in 2011, India announced it was working
with Russia to develop a terminally guided ICBM in
response to Chinese medium-range ballistic missile
deployments near India’s borders.133
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New Delhi has also pushed the development of
a nuclear submarine force, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), missile defenses, long-range
cruise missiles, and improved strategic command and
control and intelligence systems. India has not yet
competed with China weapon-for-weapon. But if China were to increase its nuclear weapons deployments
signiﬁcantly, Indian leaders might argue that they
had no other choice but to increase their own nuclear
holdings.
This then brings us back to Pakistan. It has done all
it can to keep up with India militarily. Since Islamabad
is already producing as much plutonium and highly
enriched uranium as is possible, it would likely seek
further technical assistance from China and ﬁnancial
help from its close ally, Saudi Arabia. Islamabad may
do this to hedge against India, whether China or India build their nuclear arms up or not. There is also
good reason to believe that Saudi Arabia may want
to cooperate on nuclear weapons-related activities
with Pakistan or China to help Saudi Arabia hedge
against Iran’s growing nuclear weapons capabilities.
It is unclear if either China or Pakistan would actually
transfer nuclear weapons directly to Saudi Arabia or
choose instead to merely help it develop all aspects of
a “peaceful” nuclear program, including reprocessing
and enrichment. They might do both.134
In this regard, Saudi Arabia has made it known that
it intends to build up its “peaceful” nuclear energy capabilities and will not forswear its “right” to enrich
uranium or to reprocess plutonium. This would constitute one of the most lucrative, best ﬁnanced near- and
mid-term nuclear power markets in the world. The
reactors Saudi Arabia might build also could serve as
the basis for development of a major nuclear weapons
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option. As Saudi Arabia’s former head of intelligence
told NATO ministers, the kingdom would have to get
nuclear weapons if Iran did.135
Saudi Arabia is not the only Muslim state to be
pursuing a nuclear future. Turkey also announced an
ambitious “peaceful” atomic power program shortly
after Iran’s nuclear enrichment efforts were revealed
in 2002 and expressed an interest in 2008 in enriching
its own uranium.136 Given Turkish qualms about Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons, the possibility of Ankara
developing a nuclear weapons option (as it previously
toyed with doing in the late-1970s)137 must be taken
seriously. In addition, Algeria and Egypt (political rivals) and Syria (a historical ally of Iran) all have either
attempted to develop nuclear weapons options or refused to foreswear making nuclear fuel, a process that
can bring them within weeks of acquiring a bomb.
Algeria now has enough plutonium and the skills to
separate it from spent fuel to make several bombs’
worth.138 Egypt, which has long complained about
Israeli nuclear weapons and previously attempted to
get nuclear weapons, just announced its intention to
tender bids for its first large power reactor.139 Israel,
meanwhile, continues to make nuclear weapons materials at Dimona,140 and all of these states have nuclearcapable missile systems (see Figure 14).
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Note: States in light gray already have established nuclear power
programs.

Figure 14. States Planning to Have Their First
Nuclear Power Reactor by or before 2035.
Very little of this rhymes with the world a half-century ago. In the early-1960s, the only countries with civilian nuclear power reactors were the United States,
the UK, and Russia. The number now is 31 states. Most
of these are in Eastern and Western Europe but, as the
map in Figure 14 makes clear, other states in far less
stable regions are hoping to bring their ﬁrst nuclear
power plants online before the year 2035. This trend,
particularly in the Far and Middle East, has strategic
implications.
As already noted, each of these plants—even the
most proliferation-resistant light water reactor types—
can be regarded as “nuclear bomb starter kits.” Although the nuclear industry has consistently promoted
the mistaken idea that the plutonium power reactors
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produce is unsuitable to make bombs, these reactors
can be operated not only to produce large amounts
of reactor-grade plutonium, but of weapons-grade
and near-weapons-grade plutonium as well.141 In fact,
in their ﬁrst year or so of normal power production
operation, these reactors can produce over 50 bombs’
worth of near-weapons-grade plutonium. If refueled
every 10 months, they can produce over 30 bombs’
worth of weapons-grade plutonium.142 Also, the plants
can and have been used as covers to acquire weaponsrelated technology, hardware, and training. In addition, the massive amounts of low-enriched fresh fuel
stored at these reactors for safety reasons can afford a
source of enriched uranium to jump-start a uranium
enrichment weapons option.143 That is why efforts are
made to control the export of these plants, and why
they are routinely inspected to guard against military
diversions.144
As for declared nuclear fuel making plants—uranium hexaﬂuoride and enrichment facilities, plutonium reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants, etc.—
there is a deeper problem that relates to the limits of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards themselves. Even under ideal circumstances,
the agency allows that with commercial-sized plants,
it can lose track of special nuclear material. The margins of statistical error associated with the inspection
of these plants are egregiously large. Consider the reprocessing plant Japan wants to operate at Rokkasho.
In this case, the agency can be expected to lose track of
roughly 250 kilograms (i.e., roughly 50 first-generation
bombs’ worth) a year. Another way to put this is that
nearly 50 bombs’ worth of weapons-usable plutonium
could possibly go missing from Rokkasho without setting off any international inspection alarms at all.145
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Will the world be able to cope with the further
spread of such “peaceful” nuclear facilities? Given the
additional noted missile, ﬁssile, and weapons trends,
what, if anything, can be done to avoid their military
diversions or worse—more widespread nuclear weapons competitions and, far worse, a possible accidental
or intentional use of nuclear weapons?
WHAT MIGHT HELP
These trends invite disorder. How much depends
on how well the United States, Russia, China, and
other key states deal with them.
Despite its strained relations with Moscow over
Ukraine, the United States is still committed to negotiating more nuclear weapons reductions with Russia.146 New START is supposed to be followed eventually by an agreement that will cover both strategic
and theater nuclear arms in Europe. The Obama administration is committed to bringing the CTBT into
force and is on record trying to secure an international
agreement to end the production of ﬁssile material for
nuclear weapons. The United States has encouraged
all countries to protect civilian and military nuclear facilities and stores of weapons-usable nuclear materials
against theft or sabotage. It has tried to persuade nonweapons states to forgo reprocessing or enrichment to
make their own nuclear fuels.
But these U.S. nuclear control initiatives, even if
successful, still leave much to be done. Several related areas cry out for greater attention than they are
currently receiving in Washington: nuclear and missile developments in China and East Asia, the global
spread of “peaceful” nuclear technology, and the continued failure to develop a consistent, broad approach
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to preventing nuclear proliferation. This gives rise to
three recommendations.
1. Clarify China’s strategic military capabilities
and promote nonproliferation and arms control
measures that limit strategic weapons proliferation
in Asia. Most currently promoted arms control and
nuclear nonproliferation proposals (e.g., the CTBT,
FMCT, limits on missile defenses, START and INF)
were originally designed to limit arms competitions
between the United States and Russia, or the Soviet
Union before it. The NPT was initially designed to reduce the prospects of nuclear proliferation in Europe.
As the world’s economic and strategic center of gravity shifts toward Asia, it would make sense to tailor
our control efforts to be more relevant to this region.
Wither Beijing?
This means, ﬁrst of all, clarifying China’s strategic capabilities. Beijing’s recent revelations that it has
built 3,000 miles of deep tunnels, to protect and hide
its dual-capable missiles and related nuclear warhead
systems, suggests we need to reassess our estimates of
China’s nuclear-capable missile and nuclear weapons
holdings. Are Beijing’s revelations about its tunnels
just disinformation designed to intimidate? Or is it
hiding more military assets than we currently assess it
has? What is it planning to acquire and deploy? How
much military ﬁssile material—plutonium and highly
enriched uranium—does China currently have on
hand? How likely is it that China has or will militarize
or expand its ﬁssile material holdings? How many
different types of nuclear weapons does it have or intend to deploy? How much ﬁssile material does each
type require? How many missile reloads does China
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currently have; how many is it planning to acquire?
How extensive are Chinese deployments of multiple
warheads for the country’s missiles, and how much
further might China expand these deployments? For
which missile types and in what numbers? How many
nuclear and advanced conventional warheads is China deploying on its missiles, bombers, submarines,
and artillery? What are its plans for using these forces? How might these plans relate to China’s emerging
space, missile defense, and anti-satellite capabilities?
All of these questions, and more, deserve review within the U.S. Government, with America’s allies, and, to
the extent possible, in cooperation with India, Russia,
and the Chinese.
As a part of this review, it also would be helpful
to game alternative war and military crisis scenarios
that feature China’s possible use of these forces. These
games should be conducted at senior political levels
in American and allied governments. Conducting
such games should also inform U.S. and allied arms
control policies and military planning. With regard
to the latter, a key focus would have to be how one
might defend, deter, and limit the damage that Chinese nuclear and non-nuclear missile systems might
otherwise inﬂict against the United States, its bases in
the Western Paciﬁc, America’s friends and allies, and
Russia.
This could entail not only the further development
and deployment of active missile defenses, but also
of better passive defenses (e.g., base hardening and
improving the capacity to restore operations at bases
after attacks; hardened command, control, and communication systems; etc.) and possibly new offensive
forces—more capable, long-range conventional strike
systems to help neutralize possible offensive Chinese
operations.
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Yet another focus for such gaming would be to
clarify the likely consequences of Japanese or South
Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons. These games
should be held routinely, bilaterally, and multilaterally with our allies and friends and, at times, with all
of the key states, including China, represented by informed experts and ofﬁcials. The aim of such games
would not only be to understand just how risky Japanese and South Korean nuclear proliferation might
be, but also to clarify the risks China and North Korea
will run if they continue to build up their missile and
nuclear forces.
Nuclear Missiles.
Such gaming should also encourage a review of
Washington’s current arms control agenda. Here, several speciﬁc ideas, particularly relevant to Asia, deserve attention. First among these is talks with China,
Russia, and other states about limiting ground-based,
dual-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. China possesses more of these systems than any other state.
Counting American, Russian, Indian, Pakistani, North
Korea, South Korean, and Chinese ground based missiles, Asia is targeted by more such missiles than any
other region.
Unlike air and sea-based missiles, ground-launched
systems can be securely communicated with and fired
instantly upon command. As such, they are ideal for
use in a ﬁrst strike. These accurate, dual-capable missiles also can inﬂict strategic harm against major bases
and naval operations when carrying conventional
warheads.
Reagan referred to these weapons as “nuclear
missiles,” and looked forward to their eventual
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elimination. Toward this end, he concluded the INF
Treaty agreement, which eliminated an entire class of
ground-based nuclear-capable missiles, and negotiated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
which was designed to block the further proliferation of nuclear-capable systems (i.e., rockets and unmanned air-breathing systems capable of lifting over
500 kilograms for a distance of at least 300 kilometers).
With the promotion of space-based missile defenses,
Reagan hoped to eliminate enough of such groundbased missiles to eliminate credible nuclear ﬁrst strike
threats.147
Which states have an incentive to eliminate these
missiles? The United States eliminated all of its intermediate ground-launched missiles under the INF
Treaty. Most of America’s shorter-range missiles are
either air-launched or below MTCR range-payload
limits. As for U.S. ground-based ICBMs, they are all
based in ﬁxed silos. To avoid being knocked out in any
major nuclear exchange, these missiles may have to be
launched on warning. Russia, on the other hand, has a
large, road-mobile ICBM force. At the same time, it is
worried about growing numbers of long-range precision missiles that both the United States and China are
developing that it cannot easily defend against.148
India and Pakistan have ground-launched ballistic missiles, but some of their most seasoned military
experts have called for the elimination of short-range
missiles, arguing that these weapons are only likely to
escalate border disputes.149 As for China, it has much
to gain by deploying more ground-launched missiles,
unless, of course, such deployment causes India, Russia, and the United States to react militarily. The United States has been developing hypersonic boost glide
systems that could provide it with prompt global
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strike options. It could base these systems either in the
continental United States or in forward bases in the
Western Paciﬁc.150 It also has hundreds of silo-based
ICBMs that it could affordably convert to deliver advanced non-nuclear payloads, including hypersonic
boost glide systems.151 Provoking the development of
such U.S. weapons would not be in China’s interest,
or Russia’s. Talks about reducing long-range, nuclear-capable ground-based missile systems should be
explored.152
Forward Nuclear Deployments.
Another arms restriction that should be considered
is keeping the world’s nuclear-armed states from deploying, beyond what is already in place, any nuclear
weapons in peacetime on the soil of states that lack
such weapons. An immediate concern is Saudi Arabia,
which has been rumored to be interested in buying
nuclear weapons either from China or Pakistan, or in
getting either nation to deploy several of their warheads there. Under the NPT, it is permissible for nuclear weapons states to deploy their weapons in states
that lack such weapons so long as these weapons stay
under the “control” of the donor nuclear weapons
state. This provision in the NPT was crafted in the
1960s to allow the United States to continue to deploy
tactical nuclear weapons to NATO countries and East
Asia, and for the Soviet Union to do so in Warsaw Pact
countries.
Although the United States continues to forward
base some of its weapons in Europe, long-range
bombers and missile systems have made it possible to
remove all of the forward deployed U.S. tactical nuclear systems from East Asia. Given that Washington
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has no plans to reintroduce them or to increase existing deployments, it may be possible to broker some
understanding to forbid any further deployments in
exchange for Chinese and Pakistani pledges not to
deploy any of their nuclear arms beyond their soil.
Given the turmoil in the Persian Gulf region, brokering such an understanding would be timely. It
also would have the immediate advantage of engaging Pakistan, a non-NPT member, in some form of
nuclear arms restraint. This is something that should
be encouraged more generally with nuclear weaponsarmed non-NPT members. Given Pakistan’s rivalry
with India, perhaps New Delhi could be persuaded
to consider adopting such limits as well. Beyond this,
other limits, including on nuclear ﬁssile production,
might be sought, not only by Pakistan and India,
but Israel as well. In this manner, one could begin to
view states that are now outside the NPT as being instead NPT members in noncompliance—i.e., as states
that, by taking steps toward nuclear restraint, might
improve their current noncompliant NPT status.
Fissile Limits, Starting with China.
Additional nuclear restraints should also be promoted among the nuclear weapons-armed states. Although there is no clear legally binding obligation for
the nuclear-armed states to disarm, the NPT encourages all states to make good faith efforts to do so.153 If
the United States could get other states to reduce their
nuclear weapons capabilities in a veriﬁable fashion, it
should be open to continuing to do so itself. Reaching new treaty agreements, though, ought not be the
only measure of progress. Although it may not be possible to conclude a ﬁssile material cutoff treaty any-
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time soon, all of the other permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council should press China
to follow their lead in unilaterally forswearing making ﬁssile material for weapons. This, in turn, could
be helpful in pressing for moratoriums on “peaceful”
nuclear fuel making of nuclear weapons-usable fuels
as well.154
In this regard, an informal moratorium on commercial plutonium recycling would make sense. A
good place to begin would be in East Asia and the
Paciﬁc, starting with China, the United States, Japan,
and South Korea. Here, it is worth noting that the
2012 report of the U.S. Blue Ribbon Commission on
America’s Nuclear Future determined that dry cask
storage would make more sense for the United States
to pursue than commercial plutonium recycling in the
near and mid-term.155 Meanwhile, America’s efforts to
convert weapons plutonium into commercial mixed
oxide fuel (MOX) have encountered difﬁculties.156 As
for Japan’s planned plutonium reprocessing and fast
reactor programs, Tokyo will have trouble implementing them, given its reduced reliance on nuclear power.
South Korea wants to recycle plutonium in a prototype integrated fast reactor, but this program may
well get pushed back considerably. Also, its planned
ﬁrst fuel loading will be low-enriched uranium, not
plutonium-based fuel.157
China is currently negotiating with AREVA to
build a commercial reprocessing plant nearly identical to the Rokkasho plant in Japan. Price remains a
sticking point. According to nuclear analysts, Beijing
might build this large commercial reprocessing plant
by 2025, have it separate plutonium for 10 to 20 years,
and stockpile this material to fuel a ﬂeet of commercial breeder reactors.158 This view, in turn, is driven
by the expectation that uranium yellowcake will be
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unavailable after 2050 for anything less than 130 (current) dollars per pound.159
This uranium price projection is speculative and
rebuttable. What is not is the potential military utility of China’s civilian plutonium program. As already
noted, the commercial-sized reprocessing plant the
Chinese nuclear establishment may decide to build
could produce enough plutonium for roughly 1,500
first-generation bombs annually. Assuming China’s
ﬁrst breeder reactor came online by 2040, its ﬁrst fueling with plutonium would come only after China had
amassed well over 20,000 weapons’ worth of plutonium. The large reprocessing plant, if it is built, would
be located close to China’s ﬁrst military plutonium
nuclear production site at Jiayuguan.
Of course, if any of the three East Asian states begins to reprocess plutonium commercially, the other
two would almost certainly follow, as much as a security hedge against each other as for any commercial purpose. For similar reasons, each is interested in
signiﬁcantly expanding its capacity to enrich uranium.
To head this off, it would be helpful to call for a freeze
on the deployment of any further commercial uranium enrichment capacity in China, Japan, and Korea
(North and South). At a minimum, the United States,
France, and Russia should refrain from promoting
large fast reactors in the region.160
As already noted, the United States and Russia
maintain surplus nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials stockpiles; and India, Israel, Pakistan,
China, Japan, France, and the UK hold signiﬁcant
amounts of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium and
uranium. This ﬁssile material overhang increases security uncertainties as to how many nuclear weapons
these states might have or could fashion relatively
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quickly. Given the veriﬁcation difﬁculties with the
proposed ﬁssile material cutoff treaty and the improbabilities of such a treaty being brought into force, it
would be useful to consider control alternatives.161
One idea, backed by several analysts, is a voluntary initiative known as the ﬁssile material control
initiative.162 It would call on nuclear weapons-usable
material producing states to set aside whatever ﬁssile
materials they have produced in excess of their immediate military or civilian requirements for either ﬁnal
disposition or internationally veriﬁed safekeeping.
Russia and the United States have already agreed to
dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and
have blended down 683 tons of weapons-grade uranium for use in civilian reactors. Much more could be
done to dispose and end the production of such weapons-usable nuclear materials, not only in the United
States and Russia, but also in other ﬁssile-producing
states, including those in Asia.163
2. Encourage nuclear supplier states to condition
their further export of civilian nuclear plants upon
the recipients forswearing reprocessing spent reactor fuel and enriching uranium, and press the IAEA
to be more candid about what it can safeguard. Will
Iran’s pursuit of “peaceful” nuclear energy serve as a
model for Saudi Arabia (which says it wants to build
several large power reactors before 2035), Turkey
(which plans to build 20), Egypt (1), and Algeria (3)?
When asked, none of these countries has been willing
to forgo making nuclear fuel. So far, only Turkey and
the UAE have ratiﬁed the IAEA’s tougher nuclear inspection regime under the Additional Protocol. There
also is the outstanding issue of whether the United
States will eventually authorize South Korea to
recycle U.S.-origin nuclear materials.
71

All of this should be a worry, since, as already
noted, the IAEA cannot ﬁnd covert enrichment or
reprocessing facilities or reactor plants with much
conﬁdence (cf. recent history regarding nuclear plants
in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria). Once a large reactor operates in a country, fresh enriched uranium becomes available and raises the possibility that it could
be seized for possible further enrichment to weaponsgrade in a covert or declared enrichment plant. Alternatively, the reactor’s plutonium-laden spent fuel
could be reprocessed to produce many bombs’ worth
of plutonium. Unfortunately, IAEA inspections at declared, commercial-sized uranium hexaﬂuoride and
enrichment plants, plutonium reprocessing facilities,
and plutonium fuel production plants could lose track
of several scores of crude bombs’ worth of special
nuclear material annually.
The Gold Standard.
Given these points and recognizing that the authority to inspect anywhere at any time without notice
is not yet available to the IAEA (even when it operates
under the Additional Protocol), any state’s pledge not
to conduct reprocessing or enrichment could not be
fully veriﬁed in a timely manner. Still, securing such
a legal pledge would have some value: It would put a
violating country on the wrong side of international
law if and when it was found out, and it would make
such action sanctionable. This may not be as much as
one wants or needs, but it is far more of a deterrent to
nuclear misbehavior than what current nonproliferation limits afford.
Other than the United States, no nuclear supplier state (i.e., Russia, France, Japan, China, or South
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Korea) has yet required any of its prospective customers to commit to not enrich uranium or reprocess spent
fuel to extract plutonium or to ratify the Additional
Protocol. Worse, the United States itself is backing
away from insisting on these conditions (often labeled
the nonproliferation “gold standard” for U.S. civilian
nuclear cooperation).164
There is some support in the U.S. Congress for
making it more difﬁcult to ﬁnalize any future U.S.
nuclear cooperative agreements with non-nuclear
weapons states like Saudi Arabia unless they agree to
the U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative conditions.165 These
congressmen believe that by taking the lead on imposing such nonproliferation conditions, the United
States would be in a much better position to persuade
other nuclear supplier states to do the same.
With the Japanese and South Koreans, close U.S.
nuclear cooperation and security guarantees could be
leveraged to secure these countries’ agreement to such
conditions on their nuclear exports. They and the Chinese want to export reactors based on U.S. designs. It
is unclear whether they can do so legally to states that
do not have a nuclear cooperative agreement with the
United States. China, meanwhile, needs all the help it
can get from the United States to complete the Westinghouse reactors it is building and the Chinese variant on which it is basing much of its nuclear future.
As for France, the U.S. Department of Energy is paying it signiﬁcant sums to complete a mixed oxide fuel
fabrication plant at Savannah River, South Carolina.
Given technical and financial problems, France may
have difficulty exporting reactors without significant
Chinese support.166 With Russia as well as China, the
United States may need to be more candid about the
safety issues construction and operation of their reac-
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tors present, and offer to renew nuclear cooperation
to help resolve these concerns in exchange for upgrading the nonproliferation conditions on their nuclear
exports.167 Each of these points constitutes nuclear leverage that Washington could apply to push broader
supplier application of gold standard nonproliferation
requirements with each of the nuclear supplier states.
Timely Detection.
It also would be helpful if the IAEA was more honest about what kinds of nuclear activities and material holdings it can actually safeguard effectively—i.e.,
which ones it can inspect so as to detect military diversions in a timely fashion and which ones it cannot. As
it is, the IAEA is unwilling to make public its assessments of the agency’s ability to meet its own timeliness detection goals (which are by no means strict).
Meanwhile, no state, including the United States, has
yet assessed IAEA’s safeguards effectiveness.168
In the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when only a
handful of states lacking nuclear weapons were interested in enriching uranium or separating plutonium
from spent reactor fuel, this lax approach may have
been tolerable. Today, however, Japan, South Korea,
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Vietnam, and Jordan are all either making enriched uranium or reprocessing spent reactor
fuels or reserving their “right” to do so. All of these
states are members of the NPT and have pledged not
to acquire nuclear weapons. Should we assume that
none of them will ever cheat? What conﬁdence should
we have that the IAEA would be able to detect possible
diversions early enough for the other NPT members
to prevent them from producing nuclear weapons?
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Currently, the IAEA’s own nuclear safeguards
guidelines set routine inspection intervals at
roughly the time it estimates is needed to convert certain special nuclear materials into bomb cores. The
IAEA’s ability to verify production ﬁgures at large
reprocessing and enrichment facilities—e.g., uranium
hexaﬂuoride, reprocessing, uranium enrichment, plutonium, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants—is
limited. Not only does the agency have difﬁculty detecting abrupt diversions in a timely fashion (i.e., it
may only be able to learn of diversions after they have
occurred), but the margins of error associated with the
IAEA’s ability to detect small, incremental diversions
are still equivalent to many bombs’ worth every year.
In either case, once a state has enough fissile material to make a bomb, it could break out well before
the IAEA or other states could intervene to prevent
acquisition.
These facts are troubling. What makes them doubly so is that the IAEA has yet to share these speciﬁcs
publicly in any detail. Worse, it continues to claim that
it can safeguard (i.e., provide “timely detection” of
possible military nuclear diversions) these materials
and plants, when in many cases it cannot.
It is essential that inspectors and diplomats distinguish between what inspectors can merely monitor (i.e., inspect to build general conﬁdence that diversions have not taken place sometime in the past)
from what they can actually safeguard (i.e., inspect to
assure detection of military diversions early enough
so outside parties could have sufﬁcient time to block
actual bomb making). If this distinction were made
clear, governments could fully appreciate and hopefully curtail nuclear activities and holdings that are
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not safeguardable and therefore dangerous.169 This, in
turn, would make promoting tougher nonproliferation standards, like the gold standard, much easier.
3. Anticipate and ward off nuclear proliferation
developments before recognized redlines have been
clearly violated. One of the regrettable legacies of
the Cold War is the habit U.S. and allied government
ofﬁcials have acquired of waiting for irrefutable evidence of undesirable, foreign nuclear weapons developments before taking action. This must change.
After the Soviet Union ﬁrst acquired nuclear
weapons in 1949, the West’s aim in competing against
it was not so much to prevent it from acquiring more
strategic weapons as it was to prevent it from establishing strategic superiority. For this purpose, it was
sufﬁcient that Western military forces remain modern
and numerous enough to deter Soviet offensive capabilities—i.e., that Russia’s strategic technology stay
one or more generations behind ours and that its strategic deployments never change the relative balance
of power. If Russia deployed a new strategic nuclear
rocket, Washington would focus on what the Soviets
had built, build a bigger or better U.S. version, or develop some new passive or active defenses or counteroffensive forces that would neutralize the new Soviet
weapon system.
After the United States and Russia ratiﬁed a
number of strategic arms limitation agreements, any
Russian strategic nuclear deployment that exceeded
agreed limits became a matter for diplomatic adjudication. In either case, U.S. or allied action turned
on detecting and verifying the violation of agreed or
implicit redlines. Fortunately, in this competition, the
Soviets ultimately failed to keep up with the United
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States, and its allies and Moscow’s attempts to do
so helped bankrupt the Soviet Union financially and
politically.170
Competitive Strategies.
That was the Cold War. In our current efforts to
prevent horizontal proliferation, our objective is quite
different. Instead of merely trying to stay ahead of a
proliferating state militarily, our aim is to prevent it
from acquiring certain weapons altogether. Being able
to detect states’ possible violations of pledges not to
acquire these weapons is necessary.
The problem today, however, is that verifying such
detections is much more awkward than detecting Soviet strategic weapons developments. Whereas detecting violations of Soviet arms developments often was
deemed to be an intelligence success that frequently
promoted policy or military actions, detecting nuclear
proliferation developments today is bad news—it
only conﬁrms that our nuclear nonproliferation policy
has failed. Indeed, more often than not, by the time
one veriﬁes a nonproliferation violation, it is too late
to roll it back unless one takes relatively extreme diplomatic or military measures. It is not surprising, then,
that in more than a few proliferation cases—e.g., with
Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, South Africa, and India—U.S. ofﬁcials averted their gaze from, or denied,
intelligence that these states had acquired or tested
nuclear weapons.171
In some cases, though, the United States and its
allies did succeed in preventing nuclear weaponsrelated proliferation. The most prominent successes
included getting Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa,
Ukraine, and Libya to give up their nuclear weapons
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programs or arsenals. In these cases, the United States
and its allies had a long-term regimen of nonproliferation sanctions and export controls in place well before
the state in question ever tried to acquire or acquired
nuclear weapons (e.g., in the cases of Libya and South
Africa) or acted well before there was clear proof that
nuclear weapons were in hand or were going to be retained (e.g., with Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea,
and Ukraine).172
What these and other less well-known nonproliferation successes suggest is the desirability of creating long-term, country-speciﬁc strategies that initially
eschew dramatic actions. These strategies could be
developed along several lines. In the case of Libya and
South Africa, the West relied heavily on long-term,
bureaucratically institutionalized economic sanctions
and export controls as well as a vigilant proliferation
intelligence watch on each country’s nuclear weapons-related programs.
An even more aggressive approach would create a
set of tailored competitive strategies that would work
backwards from nuclear futures U.S. ofﬁcials want to
avoid towards those that they believe are better. The
aim here would be to set a series of mid-term (i.e., 10to 20-year) goals that would drive and guide our diplomatic, economic, military, and intelligence efforts
to shape more peaceful futures.173 Rather than wait to
act until there is proof of a nuclear weapons program
we do not want to see completed, ofﬁcials would act
earlier, taking modest steps to ward off such incipient
nuclear weapons programs, or support positive policies that might reduce the targeted state’s interest in
initiating such programs in the ﬁrst place.174
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Towards a More Hard-headed Form of Internationalism.
An integral part of working such competitive strategies would be a willingness to promote the kinds of
nonproliferation and arms control proposals noted
earlier. This would require a hard-headed kind of internationalism. Forty years ago, when U.S. and allied
arms control policies were premised upon ﬁnite deterrence—i.e., on the evils of targeting weapons and defending against them, and on the practical advantages
of holding innocents at risk in the world’s major cities—arms control rightly became an object of derision
by serious security planners.175 Since then, it almost
has become an article of conservative Republican faith
that arms control is self-defeating. It also has become
an article of faith among most liberal Democrats that
it deserves unquestioned support.176
Any serious effort to reduce future nuclear threats
will need to move beyond this ideological divide. Certainly, any nuclear threat reduction effort that supports U.S. and allied aims will be difﬁcult to sustain
unless it complements some larger diplomatic effort.
The best way to start would be to put our Cold War
fascination with mutual assured destruction theorizing aside and focus instead on what is most likely to
reduce the chances of war, nuclear proliferation, and
nuclear weapons use.177
International law also has become increasingly
stylized to restrain states from taking military action.
Its practical impact, however, has been to restrain
those states least likely to take such action even when
their action is called for. As a result, international law
has lost its standing among those most concerned
about the safety and security of their country. To be
sure, there are limits to what any international legal
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structure can achieve without the backing of sovereign military power.178 But in the past, international
law and the promotion of justiﬁable sovereign power
were seen as being mutually supportive. We need to
get back to this earlier understanding. Like maintaining peace, this is neither hopeless nor automatic.179
In any effort to return to this view, the given suggestions are a reasonable place to begin. It is clearly
desirable to reduce the number of nuclear weapons,
the amount of nuclear weapons-usable materials,
the number of plants that make them, the number of
long-range nuclear-capable missiles, and the number
of states possessing these nuclear assets. It may be imprudent to make such cuts unilaterally or without effective veriﬁcation, but we should be clear about our
willingness to compete militarily and diplomatically
to realize such reductions in a manner that avoids
such risks. Indeed, on this last point, there should be
no hesitation. Less, in this case, would be better.
Thinking Ahead.
Recently, a friend and former senior ofﬁcial under
three presidents (both Republican and Democratic)
quipped that with most nuclear weapons proliferation
problems, ofﬁcials initially are loath to act because
they believe the problem is unclear, and, then when
they ﬁnally are convinced that the problem is serious,
they conveniently insist there is no solution. This is a
pathology for inaction. It also is wrong. In fact, some
of the toughest nuclear proliferation problems can be
neutralized well before they are fully realized, and, in
key cases, have been.
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From 2013 through 2014, I held a series of workshops on alternative nuclear futures in East Asia. These
meetings, which included Chinese, Korean, Japanese,
U.S., and Russian security and energy experts and
ofﬁcials, focused on how each country would react if
it or its neighbors either acquired nuclear weapons or
ramped up the number of nuclear arms they already
had. First, I was warned that no one would come to
the meetings. Then, I was told that if they did come,
no one would speak. Finally, I was advised, if they
did speak, they would not get along. All of this advice
turned out to be wrong. In fact, there were candid Chinese and Korean exchanges about Japan’s stockpiling
of plutonium, and Japanese and Russian anxieties expressed about the opacity of China’s nuclear weapons
program. Yet, there still was a problem: All of the participants, including government ofﬁcials from each
state (including the United States), conﬁded that the
discussions we were having could never be conducted
by or within their respective governments—the topics
simply were too sensitive.
This is bad enough. Unfortunately, the challenge
of working difﬁcult security issues (including nuclear
weapons proliferation) runs even deeper than this.
Operating outside of government, I have had the
freedom not only to be vocal, but also to be consistent (two things that are difﬁcult to do while in ofﬁce).
Yet, exercising this freedom too often draws criticism
from those in or close to power as being dangerously
radical or impractical. There is no easy response to
this criticism. One strong possibility, however, is that
too many government ofﬁcials are failing to do their
jobs, while too few analysts outside government are
pointing this out. There is, after all, a strong temptation (particularly among officials who are ambitious
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or eager to please) to avoid issues that, if mishandled,
could result in catastrophe (either for themselves or
for others). Those outside of government, who wish to
maintain and expand their network of contacts, share
such caution.
Giving in to this temptation, however, risks backing into and compounding our most serious, avoidable problems. Thus, the nuclear crisis in Iran was
made worse by more than 20 years of inattention and
consistent downplaying of the risks this program
posed. When U.S. ofﬁcials ﬁnally began to focus on
the Iranian nuclear threat in the early-2000s, it had
become so mature and intractable that the available
responses were limited either to acts of war or diplomatic backsliding. Not surprisingly, this only encouraged an unhealthy political polarization of the issue.180
With nuclear weapons proliferation, these pitfalls
can be avoided, but only if those in and outside of government focus on proliferation problems earlier and
more seriously than they have to date. Of course, some
will object that we can ill afford to concentrate on anything but the most pressing nuclear crises—whether it
be North Korea, Iran, or our relations with Moscow.
“Solving” these matters, they will argue, is imperative
to avoid immediate and certain nuclear disaster and,
therefore, to assure nuclear restraint and peace for the
long haul. Perhaps. But any honest assessment would
suggest that our most urgent problems no longer allow for any simple solutions. If so, our optimism and
hopes would be better directed more toward futures
we can shape now than on correcting present crises
our past neglect has all but determined.
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